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Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been marginalized during the last 15 years. 
Bosniaks have elected a Croat member of the Presidency and formed a federal 
government twice without legitimate Croat support, completely ignoring Croat electoral 
will. Bosnia and Herzegovina is at a crossroads today, choosing between the potential for 
a prosperous future in the EU and the status quo. Reforms of government structures are 
necessary in order to solve the Croat issue and allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to ascend 
to the EU. In this paper I map out the history of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 
the 1990s and point out the difficulties they face today. I have come to the conclusion that 
the three entity solution would be the best possible way to provide Croats with equal 
rights. I hope this unique research will spark interest in the Croat issue and the importance 
of its resolution for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Introduction 
 Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina is a unique country. The Dayton Peace 
Agreement, brokered by the Western powers after the NATO bombing campaign in the 
country, stopped the greatest amount of bloodshed in Europe since WWII, but also left a 
highly unstable and deeply fragmented country which is perpetually on the edge of 
disintegration. Bosnia and Herzegovina lost its “Republic” prefix and became a 
federation made of two entities and one district formally jointly owned by both entities. 
Republika Srpska, a Serb-dominated entity functions as a unitary state, while the Bosniak 
and Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a federal state made up of ten cantons 
with their respective governments, laws and even police forces.
1
  
Three of the cantons have a Croat majority, five cantons have a Bosniak majority 
and two are ethnically mixed between Croats and Bosniaks.
2
 Brčko District, located in 
the Northeast of the country, is a self-administrated condominium and is ethnically mixed 
with substantial Bosniak, Croat and Serb population.
3
 Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement 
is the current Constitution, and its implementation is overseen by the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR). The High Representative, thus far always a European diplomat, 
has powers to impose laws, amendment entity constitutions, fire officials and prohibit 
                                                          
1
 Alberto Nardelli, Denis Dzidic, and Elvira Jukic, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: The World’s Most 
Complicated System of Government?,” The Guardian, October 8, 2014, accessed April 8, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/08/bosnia-herzegovina-elections-the-worlds-most-
complicated-system-of-government. 
2
 See Chart 1 and Map 1 in the appendix for a detailed map of the political organization of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Cantons with an ethnic Croat majority are Posavina, Zapadno-Hercegovina and Canton 10. 
Cantons with ethnic Bosniak majority are Una-Sana, Tuzla, Zenica-Doboj, Sarajevo and Bosansko 
Podrinje. Cantons Hercegovina (official name Hercegovačko-neretvanski) and Središnja Bosna are 
ethnically mixed between Croats and Bosniaks. In Središnja Bosna Bosniak constitute a slim majority, 
while in Hercegovina Croats constitute a slim majority.    
3
 Nardelli, Dzidic, and Jukic, “Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 
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officials from holding public offices among other abilites.
4
 To make the matter more 
complicated, the High Representative is the highest interpreter of the Constitution and is 
not accountable to any institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and his decisions cannot be 
appealed, not even to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, the 
High Representative is a de facto a dictator in Bosnia and Herzegovina who can overrule 
and ignore the political will of the democratically elected representatives of the three 
constituent Peoples, if he sees such decisions as beneficial for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5
 
 While the Serbs make up a vast majority of the Republika Srpska population, 
Croats and Bosniaks share the Federation. According to estimates, Bosniaks are almost 
four times more numerous than Croats in the Federation, and coupled with the current 
election laws in the Federation, this creates ability for Bosniaks to disregard the electoral 
will of Croats in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6
 It is possible for Bosniaks to 
form the government of the Federation without Croat political parties which have vast 
popular support among the Croats. Over the years, Croats have ended up in a politically 
marginalized and unequal position in comparison with the two other constitutional ethnic 
groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aim of this article is not only to investigate how 
this has happened, but also to propose possible solutions to the “Croat issue” that is 
greatly contributing to the instability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and is stalling its path to 
the European integration and economic development.  
                                                          
4
 “OHR General Information,” accessed April 8, 2015, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/. 
5
 The constituent Peoples are Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. They are constituent on the whole territory of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, although Serbs mostly live in Republika Srpska, and Bosniaks and Croats mostly 
live in the Federation. All other citizens, including both national minorities and people who simply declare 
themselves Bosnians or Herzegovinians, together with undeclared people, form a group called the “Others” 
in the constitution.   
6
 Pero Zelenika, “Hrvata Manje 27,3, Srba 9,3, Bošnjaka 3,5 Posto,” www.vecernji.ba, January 11, 2014, 
http://www.vecernji.ba/hrvata-manje-273-srba-93-bosnjaka-35-posto-914537. 
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The “Croat issue” is of great significance to the citizens and policymakers of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and especially to Croats whose rights and political power are 
critically endangered today. It is also significant to the international community involved 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-war reconstruction and implementation of Dayton 
Agreement. The International Crisis Group in their last report on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
claimed that at the moment Bosnia and Herzegovina is slowly spiraling towards 
disintegration, and hinted that the “Croat issue” can be a deciding factor for the future of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
7
 Thus, my research is very significant not only to academia that 
is engaged in the discussion about Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the 1990s, but 
it is also highly relevant to the policymakers, both Bosnian-Herzegovinian and 
international. Since no one has definitely answered how Croats ended up in the second-
class citizen position that they fill now and what can be done to resolve this issue using a 
variety of sources and looking at the overarching situation rather than focusing on a 
specific issue, I believe that my research is highly relevant.  
There is a dearth of scholarship in the English language about these issues and I 
hope to fill the void and internationalize a discussion which is so vigorously debated in 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian academic circles and the general population alike. The benefit of 
answering my research question is the potential to illustrate possible paths that Bosnian-
Herzegovinian policymakers should take in order to resolve this issue and impending 
crisis, while the risk of not answering such an important question on time might be the 
persistence of the status quo, unrest and maybe even the disintegration of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in the future. While my article will read as a policy paper with the ultimate 
                                                          
7
 Bosnia’s Future, (International Crisis Group, Europe Report N°232, July 10, 2014), i, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/232-bosnia-s-future. 
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goal of policymakers implementing or at least taking my findings into consideration, I 
will also reference the academic discussion on this topic that is being held in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, especially in the political science journal “Status”. 
My main argument is that Croats lost many rights through changes and 
amendments to the Washington Agreement and misinterpretations of the Dayton 
Agreement that were mostly perpetuated by the Office of the High Representative for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the internal reorganization of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is essential if the country is to survive. Quite simply, Croats are not on a politically equal 
position with the Bosniaks and Serbs, and this creates a lot of friction that might reignite 
the Bosnian-Herzegovinian powder keg if this issue is not resolved. The changes by the 
High Representatives (there have been seven office holders since 1995), especially those 
concerning Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, diminished Croat rights over time and 
culminated in the election of Komšić as Croat member of the Presidency without Croat 
support.  
In order to resolve the crisis I will suggest a variety of possible approaches to the 
internal reorganization of Bosnia and Herzegovina and legal guarantees for equal rights 
of all its citizens. The possible approaches to the present political crisis are the creation of 
a third entity (with a Croat majority), making Bosnia and Herzegovina a union of three 
republics, regionalization of the country, dissolution of the entities and the cantonization 
of a whole country, a return to the original Washington Agreements, a unitary and 
centralized Bosnia and Herzegovina and a status quo. I will analyze all of these possible 
solutions and list the benefits and dangers of each, although I believe that the third entity 
would be the best solution in order to protect rights of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
9 
 
and stabilize the situation in the country. The “Others” (national minorities and citizens 
who do not declare themselves members of one of the three constituent Peoples in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina) are also in a politically unequal situation. Their position is not the 
focus of my research and it is a topic for further analysis. While I acknowledge that all 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens are not equal at the moment, I will focus solely on the 
inequalities currently experienced by the Croats, especially in contrast with two other 
constituent Peoples.  
Methodology 
In order to support my thesis I will use a variety of methods and sources. I have 
included the most relevant books and journal articles written in Croatian, Bosnian, 
Serbian and English about this topic. These sources are written using, but not limited to, 
historical, political, economic, juridical and sociological approaches to the topic. Also, I 
will use analyses performed by the Institute for Political and Social Research in Mostar 
and reports by the International Crisis Group. I will in addition use the interview I 
conducted with Mr. Vladimir Šoljić, the Minister of Defense of the Croatian Republic of 
Herzeg-Bosnia during the war and president of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in 1997. Today he is president of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, the main 
cultural Croat institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I will also use a variety of news 
articles, analysis done by political scientists for state officials, official government 
documents and websites that have published in relation to this topic.  
My approach is a fresh one, because no one has used such a variety of sources 
before while looking at a general over-arching situation rather than focusing on a specific 
10 
 
sub-issue in the English language. I will start my article by giving a thorough historical 
overview of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the last days of Yugoslavia up to the Dayton 
Peace Agreement in order to give readers a much needed background that will shed light 
on the reasons why Bosnia and Herzegovina is organized as it is and why the “Croat 
issue” is a relevant issue today. I will give special emphasis to the Muslim-Croat civil 
war and its impact that resulted in the Washington Treaty. I will then look at the 
immediate post-war period between 1995 and 2000 which was, despite crimes in Central 
Bosnia against people trying to return to their homes, generally a positive time for Croats 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I will then examine the last decade and one half when Croats 
were gradually stripped of any political rights through the actions by Bosniak parties and 
decisions by the High Representatives. This gradual deconstruction of Croat political 
rights started in 2001 with the establishment of the “Alliance for Changes” that excluded 
political parties who received the most Croat votes from Federal government. I will then 
give special attention to the Croatian Home Rule and the way it was suppressed by the 
international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I shall then proceed to analyze the 
current issues of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina which include political and economic 
discrimination against them in the Federation. The most famous instance of this 
discrimination were two elections of Željko Komšić as Croat member of the Presidency 
with largely Bosniak votes and the formation of Federal government in 2010. I will then 
proceed to offer possible solutions and evaluate their advantages and disadvantages. I 
will then conclude my article with my predictions of what may happen and a suggestion 
of what both the international community and Bosnian-Herzegovinian politicians should 
11 
 
do to resolve the “Croat issue” and allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to finally begin 
ascension to the EU. 
A historical overview of modern Bosnia and Herzegovina up to the Dayton Peace 
Agreement 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina has always had a turbulent and rather difficult history. Its 
history today is highly politicized and skewed by all three constituent Peoples who 
(mis)use this history to legitimize their own political agendas and projects. Today’s 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was controlled throughout the centuries by Illyrians, Romans, 
Slavs (both of Latin and Eastern rite), Hungarians, Ottoman Turks and the Hapsburg 
Monarchy.
 8
 All three Peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina have very different views of 
their shared history. For example, while for some Ottoman Turks are seen as villains who 
enslaved the Slavs, for others they are a relatively good force who brought Islam and 
progress to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Still, pre-19
th
 century Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
history is not really all that important for this article and its many quasi-historical national 
myths have no place in serious academic work. One such myth, which is used today by 
the mostly Bosniak pro-unitary state elements is the common national Bosnian identity of 
Peoples living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. People living in Bosnia and Herzegovina did 
peacefully coexist during most of their history, but there was never a joint national 
identity in which Croats, Muslims
9
 and Serbs would identify as Bosnians and 
                                                          
8
 Charles R. Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992-1994, 1 
edition (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 5-7. 
9
 (Bosnian) Muslims was a national/ethnic name used by the Bosniaks before 1993, when they decided to 
rename their ethnic group Bosniaks. To respect this decision and also be consistent, I will use these two 
terms (Muslim, Bosniak) interchangeably when talking about Bosniaks and their history before 1993. I will 
use “Bosniaks” only when talking about them after 1993.    
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Herzegovinians.
10
 Rather, Bosnian and Herzegovinan were terms for geographical or 
regional identity, which is one of the many identities that people in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina simultaneously have, together with their ethnic and religious identities.  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, all associations and cultural clubs in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina were monoethnic Croat, Muslim or Serb clubs rather than (joint) 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian clubs.
11
 In the nineteen century people in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, under the influence of the greater Romantic Movement in Europe, started to 
form ethnic identities that are crystalized today.
12
 Austria-Hungary assumed power over 
Bosnia and Herzegovina after more than four centuries of Ottoman rule in 1878. After the 
defeat of the Central Powers in WWI Bosnia and Herzegovina was, together with other 
Austro-Hungarian territories inhabited by South Slavs and Kingdoms of Serbia and 
Montenegro, joined into the Serb-dominated Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians.
13
 
This kingdom was later re-named the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After the fall of 
Yugoslavia in 1941, the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina was incorporated into the 
Independent State of Croatia, a Nazi puppet state led by extreme Croatian nationalists and 
supported by some Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
14
  
During WWII Bosnia and Herzegovina was the site of many massacres and 
horrible crimes committed by German and Italian occupation forces, the puppet Ustasha 
government (which included both Croatian and Muslim officials), Serb nationalistic and 
pro-monarchist Chetnik units and multiethnic Communist Partisan forces headed by the 
                                                          
10
 Mirjana Kasapović, “Bosna i Hercegovina: Deset Godina Nakon Daytona,” STATUS Magazin Za 
Političku Kulturu I Društvena Pitanja, no. 9 (Spring 2006): 54. 
11
 Ibid, 55. 
12
 Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992-1994, 7-9. 
13
 Ibid, 9. 
14
 Ibid, 10-11. 
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charismatic but ruthless Marshal Josip Broz Tito.
15
 These war crimes along with the 
massacres of surrendered Chetnik and Ustasha soldiers, as well as some civilians by 
Tito’s partisans immediately after the end of WWII left long-simmering animosity and 
hatred among the three ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
16
 Still, this hatred was 
buried beneath the surface by the totalitarian Communist regime of Yugoslavia for more 
than four decades and only reappeared in the 1980s after the death of Tito.
17
 During this 
period Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the six Socialist republics that made up the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina was unique in this 
regard because it was officially a republic of three constituent Peoples: Croats, Muslims 
and Serbs, in contrast to Slovenia or Macedonia which were countries of Slovenian and 
Macedonian people respectively. Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most ethnically mixed 
region in the former Yugoslavia.  
 In 1990 the three main national parties that would dominate Bosnian-
Herzegovinian political life in the 1990s were formed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
main Muslim party was the Party for Democratic Action (PDA) centered around Alija 
Izetbegović.18 Serbs mostly supported the Serbian Democratic Party led by Radovan 
Karadžić19, while the Croats gathered around the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina that changed many leaders in the 1990s, but the most prominent 
one was Mate Boban.
20
 All the mentioned parties had branches in at least one other 
Yugoslavian Republic, and the CDU of Bosnia and Herzegovina was actually a branch of 
                                                          
15
 Ibid, 11. 
16
 Ivo Lučić, Uzroci Rata: Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992. godine (Zagreb: Despot Infinitus, 2013), 
21. 
17
 Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992-1994, 11. 
18
 Lučić, Uzroci Rata: Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992. godine, 258-9. 
19
 Ibid, 260-1. 
20
 Ibid, 262-3. 
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the CDU from Croatia led by the first Croatian President Franjo Tuđman.21 On the 25th of 
June 1991 Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia and skirmishes 
had already began in Croatia between Croatian Army and Serb paramilitary units backed 
by the Yugoslav People’s Army, soon leading to a full-fledged war.22 It was obvious that 
the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina would not last for long unless all three ethnic 
groups made an agreement on what kind of future they wanted for their ethnic group and 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.  
 In March of 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina held a census. The results were used 
many times in peace proposals during the war. According to the census, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina had a population of 4,377,033 citizens. Just under 1.9 million or 43.4 % of 
them declared themselves as Muslims, a bit less than 1.37 million or 31.2 % as Serbs and 
some 760 thousand or 17.4 % as Croats.
23
 Out of the remaining 350 thousand people, 
some 240 thousand declared themselves Yugoslavs and the others were either national 
minorities, like Hungarians, or undeclared citizens.
24
 Therefore, over 92% of the 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian population considered themselves to be a part of one of the three 
main ethnic groups. The first democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina were held 
on the 18
th
 of November 1990. These elections confirmed that all three main ethnic 
groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina were polarized and would chose to gather around their 
ethnic parties rather than to show support for multiethnic parties or reformed 
                                                          
21
 Ibid, 241. 
22
 Ibid, 318-9. 
23
 Etnička Obilježja Stanovništva: Rezultati Za Republiku I Po Opštinama - 1991. (Sarajevo: ZAVOD ZA 
STATISTIKU REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE, October 1993), 10-11, 
http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/Etnicka%20obiljezja%20stanovnistva%20bilten%20233.pdf. 
24
 Ibid, 10-11. 
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communists.
25
 At these elections, the last ones until after 1996, the three national parties 
together got more than 84% of seats in parliament and all seven seats in the Presidency.
26
 
It was clear that national parties and their policies had the overwhelming support of their 
respective ethnic groups.  
The Serbs wanted to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia which was 
becoming increasingly unitary and Serb-dominated, but they were also open to joining 
parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina that they considered Serb to Serbia, while the other 
parts could gain some sort of independence.
27
 Muslims wanted an independent Bosnia 
and Herzegovina that would be a unitary centralized republic, which would then be 
dominated by their group through the dominance of sheer numbers.
28
 Croats, the least 
numerous group, supported the confederative model for an independent Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
29
 Still, certain groups among Croat leaders, especially during the Muslim-
Croat War when the breakup of Bosnia and Herzegovina was appearing imminent, would 
not have minded seceding parts populated mostly by Croats from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and joining them with the Republic of Croatia.
30
 
 The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at least for Croats, started on the 1
st
 of 
October 1991 when the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) and the Serbian and 
Montenegrin reserve forces razed 22 Croat villages and hamlets including Ravno in 
                                                          
25
 Ibid, 286-8. 
26
 Ibid, 287. 
27
 Saša Mrduljaš, “HRVATSKA POLITIKA UNUTAR BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE U KONTEKSTU 
DEKLARATIVNOGA I REALNOGA PROSTORNOG OPSEGA HRVATSKE ZAJEDNICE / 
REPUBLIKE HERCEG-BOSNE (1991.–1994.),” Društvena istraživanja 18, no. 4–5 (102–103) (October 
30, 2009): 826–27. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid 
30
 Kasapović, “Bosna i Hercegovina: Deset Godina Nakon Daytona,” 60. 
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Eastern Herzegovina to the ground.
31
 The YPA did this in order to secure a flank and 
gain better artillery positions for shelling neighboring Dubrovnik, Croatia’s southernmost 
city. At this point, war in Croatia was in full swing and rebel Serb paramilitary forces 
supported by the YPA were sieging multiple cities and ethnically cleansing villages and 
towns all over Croatia. The destruction of Ravno and other Croat villages by the YPA 
was a clear violation of Bosnian-Herzegovinian sovereignty within Yugoslavia and an act 
of aggression against the Croat population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nonetheless, Alija 
Izetbegović, the main Muslim leader and the acting President of the seven-member 
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not react to it, saying this is not “their war”.32 
Tensions mounted from that point on and almost everyone anticipated war. 
 During 1991 Serbs started organizing and consolidating municipalities in which 
Serbs were the majority of population. Five autonomous communities were organized, 
each of them functioning as an autonomous country within Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 
the 9
th
 of January 1992, these formed the self-proclaimed Serb Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina which would adopt its own constitution and de facto declare independence 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 28
th
 of February 1992.
33
 The self-proclaimed Serb 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina also passed the decision to join Yugoslavia (then 
comprised of just Serbia and Montenegro). Muslims too were organizing and arming 
themselves in the anticipation of the war. On the 31
st
 of March 1991 the Patriotic League 
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(a Muslim paramilitary group dominated by Party for Democratic Action members) was 
formed.
34
  
Finally, Croats were also organizing and arming themselves. Croats proclaimed 
their Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia on the 18
th
 of November 1991, the very 
same day that the defense of the city of Vukovar in Croatia fell and atrocities were 
committed against civilians and prisoners of war.
35
 Its proclamation resulted out of 
distrust of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government and fear that the same destiny that 
Croats in Croatia were experiencing was awaiting Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
well.
36
 Still, it is important to note that this Community, which will later rename itself the 
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, never officially declared separation or secession 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is in contrast to Serb Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, later renamed Republika Srpska. The Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosina 
de iure remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even though there were secessionist 
tendencies among its leadership, especially during the Muslim-Croat War. De facto it was 
closely aligned with the Republic of Croatia.
37
  
In early 1992, Croat and Muslim leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed that 
Bosnia and Herzegovina should gain independence from Yugoslavia and they organized 
an independence referendum that was held on the 29
th
 of February and the 1
st
 of March 
1992. The referendum was boycotted by the Serbs and the Serbian Democratic Party 
voiced disapproval.
38
 Around 64.3% of voters voted on the referendum, representing 
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almost every Croat and Muslim voter. More than 99.4% of voters who turned up for the 
referendum voted for an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on March 3
rd
 
President Izetbegović declared independence, despite the fact that the referendum did not 
have support of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
39
  
Bosnia and Herzegovina was officially recognized on 6th of April by the US and 
many European countries, but the war had already been raging by then.
40
 Serb 
paramilitary forces, backed up by the YPA, were already skirmishing with Muslim and 
Croat militias and ethically cleansing areas in Northern, Central and Eastern Bosnia. In 
April, the siege of Sarajevo was already under-way and thousands of Muslim refugees 
were fleeing Eastern Bosnia, finding safe havens in ethnically mixed Croat-Muslim 
Central Bosnia.
41
 Croats on the 8
th
 of April 1992 formed the Croatian Defense Council 
(CDC), a Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croat army, with the goal of resisting further Serb 
attacks.
42
 Muslims formed the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABH), officially a state 
army, but heavily dominated by Muslims which comprised a vast majority of its units.
43
 
The CDC and ABH cooperated to halt Serb aggression in 1992 and parts of 1993, but 
between 1993 and 1994 they were engaged in a civil war.  
Even as early as 1992 there were sporadic skirmishes between Croat and Muslim 
units, but often not much more than the usual fights between soldiers for loot or for 
honour.
44
 During this time, the Republic of Croatia sent a substantial aid in weapons, 
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supplies, money and experts to the CDC and some Croatian Army units were included in 
the fighting against Serbs side-by-side with the CDC and ABH. The CDC was officially a 
part of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with ABH, and this 
alliance seemed solid.
45
 Croatia was also the only route from which the Sarajevo 
government could receive weapons and supplies, because they were surrounded by Serbs 
on all other sides. Croatia even accepted some 450,000 Muslim refugees, mostly women 
and children, and provided them with shelter and food, thus increasing friendly relations 
between Croats and Muslims.
46
 Nonetheless, the relations between the CDC and ABH 
went poorly after the fall of Jajce on the 29
th
 of October 1992.
47
 Jajce was a relatively big 
town in Central Bosnia that was defended by both the CDC and ABH units. Because of 
lack of proper cooperation and the superior firepower of the Serb forces, Jajce fell, 
leaving thousands of Croats and Muslims to find refuge in Central Bosnia. Croat refugees 
went further to Croat-dominated Western Herzegovina, while the Bosniak refugees 
stayed around Travnik in Central Bosnia.
48
 Croat and Muslims started blaming each other 
for the fall of Jajce, creating a very hostile environment. 
The Vance-Owen Peace Plan that had the aim of stopping the war and creating a 
federal Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of three Serb, three Muslim and three Croat 
cantons (with Sarajevo as an ethnically neutral canton and  a capital) was signed by all 
three sides, but was never ratified.
49
 The CDC was supposed to assume control over the 
ABH units in Croat cantons, while the ABH would assume control over the CDC in 
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Muslim cantons. Soon Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbs held a referendum about the plan, 
rejecting it. ABH headquarter rejected to put ABH units in command of the CDC in Croat 
cantons, despite Croats already trying to achieve this on the ground due to the 
negotiations of Vance-Owen Peace Plan.
50
 This decision spared tensions that ignited the 
conflict and started another war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main problem was that 
Canton number 10, which was on an area of much of Central Bosnia, had a slim Croat 
majority before the war, but with thousands of refugees coming from Eastern Bosnia and 
finding shelter there, Muslims had the actual majority in 1993. Moreover, Muslims, who 
made up 44% of population were cornered on some 15% of Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
territory. They needed Central Bosnia to house their refugees and they desperately 
needed arms factories in Vitez and Novi Travnik controlled by the CDC.
51
  
As a result of both the CDC and the ABH clinging onto this important area and 
refusing to leave it under control of the other ethnic group, skirmishes occurred all across 
Central Bosnia in March 1993. The full blown war did not start until the 16
th
 of April 
later that year.
52
 On that day CDC took over a strategically important village of Ahmići 
that connected two Croat enclaves in central Bosnia, massacring around 110 Bosniaks.
53
 
The very same day in the nearby Konjic municipality the ABH massacred 22 Croats in 
the village Trusina.
54
 Vitez, headquarters of the CDC in Central Bosnia was shelled by 
ABH on the same day and the war between Muslims and Croats was in full swing. It is 
important to note that the CDC had some 8,000 soldiers in Central Bosnia, while the 
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ABH had between 82,000 and 84,000 thousands, making the ratio 10:1 in favor of the 
ABH.
55
 While all CDC soldiers were in fighting units, the ABH had some 25,000 in 
frontline units and the rest in reserve, making the actual ration closer to 3:1. We should 
keep in mind that Croats could not replenish their losses while the Muslims could, based 
on the reserve. ABH also had more artillery pieces, so Croat enclaves in Central Bosnia 
were under siege from the start of the conflict until the ceasefire in 1994.
56
  
Because the CDC was so outgunned and outnumbered, they used the doctrine of 
active defense, committing some crimes like Ahmići in the process.57 The ABH 
committed crimes as well, especially their Mujahedeen fighters that flocked from Islamic 
countries to take part in what they saw as Jihad between Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims 
and Bosnian-Herzegovinian Christians. Mujahedeens committed many gruesome crimes 
during the war, like ritual beheadings. A few thousand Mujahedeens fought in ABH 
units, even forming a 1,800 strong “El Mujahedeen” battalion, adding a religious element 
to the conflict.
58
 More than 100,000 Croats were expelled from Central Bosnia by the 
ABH, while some 50,000 Muslims were expelled by the CDC, forever creating animosity 
between the two ethnic groups.
59
 The Republic of Croatia supported the CDC with arms, 
supplies and volunteers during the conflict, and because of that there was international 
pressure on Tuđman to stop the aid or else face sanctions like Yugoslavia was facing at 
that time. The US managed, under the threat of sanctions, to bring both sides to the 
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negotiation table and broker a peace with the Washington Treaty that was signed on the 
18
th
 of March 1994.
60
 
The agreement stopped the war between the ABH and the CDC and effectively 
made them allies against the Serbs once again. It also created the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, a Croat-Bosniak entity. The Washington Treaty was not an ideal 
solution for Croats because they had to share one entity with Bosniaks, but it was still 
better than the continuation of the war that was disastrous for both sides, as well as the 
prospect of the complete ethnic disappearance from Central Bosnia. The original text of 
the Treaty gave a lot of power to the cantons, which were effectively federal units within 
the Federation with their own laws and government. Still, once this Treaty began to be 
amended by the High Representatives Croats were slowly to become second-class 
citizens in the Federation.  
On the 11
th
 of July 1995 the Serbs captured Srebrenica, a small Bosniak enclave 
in Eastern Bosnia and massacred more than 8,000 boys and men in only a few days.
61
 
This act of genocide created outrage in the international community, which decided that it 
was time to act more deliberately to stop the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same 
fate was threatening the city of Bihać in late July 1995, and the ABH, the CDC and the 
Croatian Army arranged a joint military command and prepared operations that had the 
main objective of taking over Serb-held areas, effectively ending the war.
62
 The Croatian 
Army, the CDC and the ABH managed to take over large areas of territory from the 
Serbs in July, August and September of 1995. The war in Croatia was effectively over 
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and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina had such losses that they were forced to the 
negotiation table. The bombing campaign Operation Deliberate Force by NATO in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Bosnian Serb Army also helped to bring their 
leadership to the negotiations.
63
 The results of these negotiations was Dayton Peace 
Agreement signed on the 14
th
 of December 1995, effectively ending the war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, even though some violence sporadically occurred long into 1996. 
By the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina was politically divided 
into two entities: Republika Srpska with a Serb majority and Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina with a Bosniak and Croat majority. The area of the Federation was changed 
from the one agreed to in the Washington Treaty and after which the Federation was 
composed of ten cantons on 51% of Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory, a change from the 
original map of the Federation that was composed of eight cantons on 58% of Bosnian-
Herzegovinian territory.
64
 The three cantons in the Federation had Croat ethnic majority, 
five cantons had Bosniak ethnic majority. Two cantons, in Central Bosnia and Neretva 
regions were the fighting during Muslim-Croat civil war were the heaviest, were 
ethnically mixed cantons with roughly half Croat and half Bosniak population. The 
Dayton Agreement also created the Office of the High Representative and some 60,000 
UN troops were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina to secure peace. Today, there are 
still 600 EUFOR troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who succeeded UN troops in their 
task to oversee the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
65
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In short, no one was satisfied with the Dayton Agreement. Serbs were not happy 
that they were forced to stay in independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, although they 
received their own entity on which they make up around 90% of the population, and hope 
that they might secede one day.
66
 Bosniaks were uneasy about Republika Srpska and are 
still afraid that it might one day secede. They are also afraid that Croat territories in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat municipalities in the Federation) might also try to secede, 
which would leave a Bosniak state surrounded by Croatian and Serbian countries. 
Consequently, they want a unitary state and the abolition of the Dayton Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which in Bosniak opinion is a result of genocide of Bosniaks.
67
 Croats, on 
the other hand, are against the disparity that the Dayton brought and they demand their 
own entity in order to prevent losing political rights, as is happening in the Bosniak 
dominated Federation in which Croats make up just over 20% of the population.
68
 
Therefore, no one was happy with the agreement, but at least it ended the war and 
allowed Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain an independent country. Hostilities between 
the three ethnic groups are still very much alive, and conflict has continued since the 
Dayton Agreement. The conflict is now political rather than militant. The years between 
the Dayton Agreement and 2001 were generally seen as good years during which much 
of the country was rebuilt, and some refugees returned to their homes. 
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The golden age for Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 The years between 1996 and the end of 2000 are generally seen as the golden age 
for Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
69
 During this time Croats, despite having to share 
the Federation with the Bosniaks instead of having their own entity like the Serbs, 
enjoyed a great political freedom and relative economic prosperity.
70
 They were able to 
freely elect their own representatives in the canton, Federation and state levels, and they 
were politically equal with the Bosniaks in the Federation. During this time a lot of 
infrastructure in Bosnia and Herzegovina was rebuilt, and Croats also enjoyed financial 
support from the Republic of Croatia. Moreover, Croat refugees slowly started going 
back to their homes in most of Central Bosnia, although not nearly in the same numbers 
that were expelled during the war. Consequently, today this area has substantially less 
Croats than it did in 1991.
71
 Their return to parts of Central Bosnia next to Croat enclaves 
that survived the war was more sustainable due to a substantial number of Croats in that 
region that stayed during the war, especially in contrast to Central-East Bosnia or 
Northern Bosnia. These parts had a substantial number of Croat refugees who never 
returned to their homes. Tensions were still high, and sporadic acts of violence were 
common, but the country was slowly transitioning to the peaceful period. During this 
period, Croats had their own TV station and enjoyed substantial cultural and educational 
autonomy in their own language, as education is administered by Cantons rather than at 
the Federal or state level. 
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 The Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was formally dissolved on the 14
th
 of 
August 1996 and it transferred its power and “Croat legitimacy” to the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but even today Croats are celebrating its establishment on the 
18
th
 of November.
72
 On the 14
th
 of September 1996, the very first post-war elections were 
held with a record turnout of almost 80%. The CDU candidate Krešimir Zubak won 
almost 89% of Croat votes, while the Party for Democratic Action candidate Alija 
Izetbegović won 80% of Bosniak votes, and the Serbian Democratic Party candidate 
Momčilo Krajišnik won 67% of Serb votes.73 This showed that the same three national 
parties that were in power during the war still had overwhelming support from their 
respective ethnic groups.  
 The main problem during this time period, together with war scars and hostile 
political rhetoric, was that of refugee return. Despite good efforts by international 
organizations, thousands of refugees never returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina. They 
either could not return due to economic problems or ethnic hostilities, or just chose to live 
in more prosperous countries. Most of them permanently immigrated to Western Europe 
and North America, as well as Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. During the conflict, 65% 
of Croats were displaced and driven away from their homes, some internally, and some as 
refugees and asylum seekers.
74
 This is a staggering number, especially in comparison 
with the 53% of Bosniaks and 52% of Serbs that were displaced during the same time.
75
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Refugees mostly returned to places where their ethnic group was dominant, and did not 
really return in significant numbers to places in which they were a minority due to a 
combination of fear and lack of a jobs and opportunities for a sustainable future.  
Therefore, Croats returned only to parts of Central Bosnia, while the other parts in 
which they had substantial population before the conflict, like Kakanj and Bugojno did 
not see much return. The return rate to the Posavina region (Northern Bosnia) in 
Republika Srpska was even worse and today only a fraction of the pre-war Croat 
population lives here.
76
 In general, populations of all three ethnic groups mostly returned 
or relocated to the parts of the country in which their ethnic group was a majority. Thus 
Croats never really returned in great numbers to parts of Central Bosnia from which they 
were ethnically cleansed during the war.
77
   
 The war changed the ethnic map and cemented ethnic divisions. There was no 
town or city in Bosnia and Herzegovina during this period, which is also mostly true 
today, that did not have a substantial ethnic majority of one of the three Peoples.
78
 
According to estimates and looking into electoral statistics, most towns and cities today 
are ethnically dominated by one group, and those which are not completely dominated as 
a whole, as is the case with Mostar, are divided into different ethnic neighborhoods. The 
era of multiethnic towns ended with the war, and all three ethnic groups are largely 
solidified on their new ethnic territories.
79
 Therefore, during this golden period for 
Croats, the three ethnic groups largely coexisted next to one another, but they did not mix 
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or share joint identities. Effectively, the area that the three armies in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina controlled in December 1995 became de facto new ethnic territories of three 
groups, and they did not always coincide with the ethnic map from 1991 when most of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s towns and municipalities were partially ethnically mixed. 
A large issue from late 1990s for Croats was the question of Mujahedeen foreign 
fighters, some of whom gained Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizenship after the war and 
created significant instability in Central Bosnia due to their connections to Al-Qaida and 
other terrorist and radical Islamist groups. They committed bombing attacks of Croat 
churches and private houses in Central Bosnia during this period, as well as a few 
massacres of refugees in Central Bosnia, further raising hostilities and creating distrust 
between Croats and Bosniaks.
80
 These crimes and massacres were often left unsolved and 
their investigations were often obstructed by Bosniak elements in police and politics, 
resulting in a more difficult return of refugees.
81
  
The incidents were carefully investigated by Jozo Leutar, a Croat who was the 
Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs in the Federation from 1996 to 1999, and a strong 
voice who warned against the radical Islamist violence that Croat refugees were targeted 
by.
82
 He was assassinated when a bomb exploded under his car in March 1999, and until 
today no one has been sentenced for this terrorist act.
83
 Even though crimes against 
refugees returning home and the assassination of Leutar created more distrust between 
Croats and Bosniaks,
84
 this period was a political golden age in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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for Croats during which they enjoyed the same rights as Bosniaks and Serbs. Two 
incidents marked the end of this period and ushered in a new era of Croat history in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, an era of diminished Croat rights when they became second-
class citizens and created Croat distrust towards the international community in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  
The first event was a forceful eviction of Croats from Drvar, Grahovo and 
Glamoč by SFOR units in 1998. These municipalities were predominantly Serb before 
the war, but in 1995 they were taken by the CDC and Croat refugees from other parts of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina relocated into empty Serb houses that were abandoned by the 
Serbs while fleeing the CDC.
85
 Most of them were finally evicted in 2002 in order to 
allow Serb refugees to return. What left a bitter memory for Croats was the fact that the 
international community and SFOR took part in these evictions, while they did not do the 
same in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those Croats in these municipalities 
eventually left for Western Europe and Croatia rather than returning to their original 
homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina from which they fled during the war, despite trying to 
stay in their temporary homes in these three municipalities.
86
 Because of this incident, 
Croats felt targeted by the international community, in a way that further radicalized them 
in wanting to gain more autonomy or to eventually connect Croat territories in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to Croatia proper. 
 The other event, that marked the end of this “golden period”, was the forced 
closure of Erotel, the Croat TV channel in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 17
th
 of 
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February 2000.
87
 SFOR units closed the TV station because it illegally broadcast 
significant amounts of programing from Croatian Radio Television, the main Croatian 
public channel in the Republic of Croatia, even though Croatian Radio Television did not 
mind this at all. Also, the goal of the international community was to create a Federal TV 
that would be the main public TV for Croats and Bosniaks in the Federation and thus 
encourage cooperation between these two groups. Federal TV was established in October 
2001, and the Erotel infrastructure and journalists were incorporated into this new TV 
station that was supposed to deliver news and programing in both Croatian and Bosnian 
languages.
88
  
Still, most of the program is done in the Bosnian language and Croats do not see 
Federal TV as their TV channel, but rather as Bosniak TV.
89
 This means that Croats do 
not have a TV channel in their own language, thus putting them in unequal position in 
comparison with Serbs and Bosniaks, because they cannot access information from Croat 
sources on public TV.
90
 Federal TV can be highly politicized, often favoring Bosniaks, 
and thus it is not hard to understand why Croats want its dissolution and the 
establishment their own TV channel. Even today, most Croats refuse to pay the required 
TV subscription, and since 2005 the CDU tried to push for TV station in the Croatian 
language through the parliament, but all the efforts thus far has been fruitless due to 
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obstructions by Bosniak political parties.
91
 In a way, the Erotel case was just a dress 
rehearsal of reforms that happened in 2000 and 2001, which had the goal to create a more 
“civic” and “multiethnic” Federation, but which put Croats in a marginalized political 
position in comparison to Bosniaks. In a desperate attempt to resist these reforms, 
disgruntled Croats declared home-rule and de facto seceded from the Federation for a few 
months in 2001, but did not secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina itself.  
The marginalization of Croats and the Croatian Home Rule 
 In October 2000, just a month before the elections held on the 11
th
 of November, 
Robert Barry, chief of the OSCE mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, suggested electoral 
amendments and changed the way officials are elected to the House of Peoples of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
92
 The Federation’s parliament is bicameral, with 
a House of Representatives acting as the lower house. Its members are elected in their 
electoral units by popular vote, in a fashion very similar to the one used in parliaments in 
national unitary countries in Europe. The Federal House of Peoples is an upper house 
with the goal of representing Peoples (originally Bosniaks and Croats, later on also Serbs) 
in the Federation, giving them veto powers to any law or decision by the House of 
Representatives that goes against vital national interests of their respective constituent 
Peoples.
93
 The reason why this house exists is to provide Croats with a legal mechanism 
to veto the laws that might be bad for their vital national interests in the Federation, due 
to the fact that Bosniaks dominate the House of Representatives by sheer numbers and 
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could form a government without any Croat party. The idea was that such a government 
could not function then, because all its decisions would be vetoed by the Croat Club in 
the House of Peoples, thus protecting less numerous Croats from political marginalization 
in the Federation. 
 This system functioned well between 1996 and 2000 and Croats used vetos 
frequently to protect their rights and interests, but with Barry’s amendments to the 
electoral laws, Croats de facto lost this vital mechanism to protect their interests in the 
Federation. Originally, the Federal House of Representatives had 140 members. The 
House of Peoples had 30 Bosniaks, 30 Croats and a proportional number of “Others”, 
who is a term used for national minorities and other citizens which are not ethnically 
Bosniak, Croat or Serb.
94
 Barry’s amendments to the Federal electoral laws allowed that 
representatives in the House of Peoples, elected from Cantonal assemblies, can be 
nominated and elected by anyone in the cantonal assembly, not only the members of that 
ethnic group.
95
 So, now it is possible for Bosniak members of the Cantonal assembly to 
vote and choose Croat representatives to the Federal House of Peoples from that Canton, 
which is especially evident in a Bosnia-Podrinje Canton where there is less than a handful 
of Croats.
96
  
Also, until the 2002 amendments created by High Representative Wolfgang 
Petritsch, Serbs were not constituent in the Federation, and were considered “Others” for 
political purposes, as well as Croats and Bosniaks were considered “Others” in Republika 
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Srpska. His sets of amendments to the Federal Constitution, reducing the number of 
members in the House of Representatives to 98, which effectively reduced the 
proportional number of Croats that could be in this house of the Parliament.
97
 Moreover, 
they added a quota of a minimum of six members of each constituent Peoples in the 
House of Representatives, even though that also meant that the Serbs would receive more 
members than their proportional share of population in the Federation. This brought in 
the possibility that the Croats, but especially Bosniaks, might elect these members merely 
by their sheer numbers. Thus Serb members of the parliament might be ethnically Serb 
but support Bosniak and Croat policies and interests, rather than Serb ones. 
 The Petritschs’s 2002 amendments to the Constitution concerning the Federal 
House of Peoples were drastic and are at the root of almost all current political problems 
that Croats face in the Federation. The amendments made Serbs constituent People in the 
Federation, and Croats and Bosniaks in Republika Srpska. Although this sounds good in 
theory and it was supposed to increase multiculturalism and cooperation between ethnic 
groups, in practice it caused even more problems. The Federation was originally designed 
as a Croat-Bosniak entity, and adding Serbs to this mix complicated things and left a lot 
of room for abusing this decision. Today we have a situation when Bosniak politicians 
run as “Serb” or “Croat” candidates, and thanks to Bosniak votes, get positions in the 
parliament that are by Constitution reserved for less numerous Croats and Serbs.
98
  
The House of Peoples members were originally elected from Cantonal 
assemblies, with mostly Bosniak cantons electing Bosniak members, and Croat cantons 
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electing Croat members, number of members from one ethnic group proportional to the 
number of people from that ethnic group living in that canton.
99
 Even in Bosniak 
Cantons’ assemblies, only Croats were electing Croat representatives for the House of 
Peoples, and vice versa. After Petritschs’s amendments, instead of 30 Bosniaks and 30 
Croats and a proportional number of “Others”, 17 Bosniaks, 17 Croats, 17 Serbs and 7 
Others are elected to the House of Peoples.
100
 This made Barry’s already bad 
amendments even worse, because now it is easier for Bosniaks to elect Croats and Serbs 
to the Federal House of Peoples, taking into consideration that the number of Croat 
representatives was almost halved. The constituent status of Serbs, only a few thousand 
of which remain in the Federation, does not make sense. It puts them in an “equal” 
position with the Croats and Bosniaks in the Federation, while Parliament in Republika 
Srpska has only one house and lacks a House of Representatives, even though it has the 
largely ineffective Council of Peoples that does not have as much weight as the Federal 
House of Peoples. Therefore, the present system is asymmetrical.  
 Still, before all of these amendments by High Representative Petritschs further 
worsen Croat political position, Barry’s amendment said that at least one member of each 
constituent Peoples would be elected from each Canton. While this sounds fine in theory, 
this means that the Bosnia-Podrinje Canton, where Bosniaks make up 99% of population 
and there are only a few Croats, elects one Croat representative, while Posavina Canton, 
in which Croats make up more than 66% of constituency and there are more than 30,000 
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Croats  also elects one Croat in the House of Peoples.
101
 In reality, this means that 
Bosniaks can elect 6 Croat members from 5 Cantons (one of Bosniak Canton elects two 
Croat members) with Bosniak majority, while Croats in theory could elect only 3 Bosniak 
members from 3 Cantons with Croat majority.
102
 If we keep in mind that it takes at least 
2/3 of representatives in the National Club (Croat, Serb and Bosniak) of the House of 
Peoples to veto a law, it means that Bosniaks can elect 1/3 of Croat representatives in the 
House of Peoples and prevent Croats from using veto laws, which actually happened 
during the last term.
103
 At the same time, Croats cannot influence Bosniak Club in any 
way, so they do not even try to do so.
104
 It is important to keep in mind that originally 
only 1/2 of votes in a club were enough for a veto, but this changed with the 2002 
amendments by the High Representative Petritsch who raised this value to 2/3.
105
  
This means that in the Federation, according to current laws, it is entirely possible 
to form a Federal government without any Croat representatives that were elected by 
Croat votes. This marginalized Croats, removing all political rights on the Federal level 
from them. Taking into consideration that more than 90% of Croats in Bosnia and 
                                                          
101
 Zoran Krešić, “Iz Goražda Se Bira Jedan Hrvat, Kao I Iz Posavine Gdje Ih Je 588 Puta Više,” 
www.vecernji.ba, September 23, 2014, http://www.vecernji.ba/iz-gorazda-se-bira-jedan-hrvat-kao-i-iz-
posavine-gdje-ih-je-588-puta-vise-962662. 
102Ivan Vukoja, “ Primjeri ne-konstitutivnosti i ne-jednakopravnosti Hrvata u Federaciji BiH,” STATUS 
Magazin Za Političku Kulturu i Društvena Pitanja, no. 16 (Summer 2013): 98-9. 
103
 Zoran Krešić, “Prije Godinu Dana Srušen Je Daytonski Sporazum U FBiH,” www.vecernji.ba, March 
16, 2012, http://www.vecernji.ba/prije-godinu-dana-srusen-je-daytonski-sporazum-u-fbih-387787. 
104
 Tadić, Ustavnopravni Položaj Hrvata u Bosni i Hercegovini od Vašingtonskog Sporazuma do Danas, 
62-63. 
105
 Ivan Vukoja, “Izbori Kao Sredstvo Diskriminacije Hrvata U BiH,” IDPI, October 9, 2014, 
http://www.idpi.ba/izbori-kao-sredstvo-diskriminacije-hrvata/. 
36 
 
Herzegovina live in the Federation, this effectively means that Croats do not have the 
same political rights and are not equal to Bosniaks and Serbs.
106
 
 In order to protest Barry’s amendments, which preceded much harsher Petritsch’s 
amendments that I mentioned above, only two weeks after implementation of Barry’s 
amendments, the CDU, the main Croat party that enjoyed close to 90% of Croat support 
then, decided to organize a Croatian National Assembly in the town of Novi Travnik. 
During their first session, they elected the leadership of this Parliament, which largely 
coincided with the CDU’s leadership. Also, they decided that on the 11th of November 
Croats will not only vote in elections, but will also vote on a referendum about whether 
they support the Croatian National Assembly (CNA) as a highest institution of Croats in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to possess “Croat legitimacy” or not. Over 90% of Croat voters 
supported this referendum question.
107
 CDU also got almost 90% of Croat votes on this 
election, and they won 25 seats out of 140 in the Federal House of Representatives. The 
CDU also tried to repel Barry’s amendments, but their efforts were futile. 
 On the 23
rd
 of January 2001, the Alliance for Change was formed, a coalition of 
ten parties that formed the government in the Federation. The Alliance was centered 
around the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the reformed Communist party of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
108
 The SDP have always had overwhelmingly Bosniak members and voters, 
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even though they claim to be a multiethnic party.
109
 They were joined by another major 
Bosniak party, seven small Bosniak or Bosnian pro-unitary state parties and the New 
Croatian Initiative (NCI), a minor Croat party. The NCI won a bit more than 1% of all 
votes in the Federation and had only 2 deputies in the House of Representatives, in 
contrast to the CDU’s 18% and 25 deputies.110 The CDU and a majority of Croats alike 
felt that the new government is formed without parties that have a majority of Croat 
support, and is not a legitimate government that can represent them. Clearly, almost 90% 
of Croats and their votes were silenced, and the CDU’s response might seem like drastic, 
but it was a desperate attempt to protect the political will of Croats in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
 Disgruntled by Barry’s amendments, the closing of Erotel, the new government 
that did not have legitimate Croat support and the situation in the Federation in general, 
the Croatian National Assembly declared an inter-municipality council that consisted of 
municipalities in the Federation with a Croat majority.
111
 They decided that on this 
territory decisions by the new government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
would not be respected.
112
 On the 27
th
 of March 2001 the president of CDU and the 
newly elected Croat member of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Presidency, Ante Jelavić, called 
on former members of the CDC, now into the joint Croat-Bosniak Federal Army units, to 
cease their alliance to the Federal government and enter in the service of the Croatian 
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National Assembly.
113
 Croatian Home Rule organized by CNA was quite effective and 
there was nothing that politicians in Sarajevo or the Bosniak Cantons and municipalities 
could do to prevent it without starting another war and inevitable bloodshed. Any military 
engagement was out of the question.  
Under international pressure, Home Rule was ceased on the 6
th
 of October 2001, 
marking a new era for Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an era in which they will lose 
all of their political agency and equality with Bosniaks in the Federation. What really 
brought down the Home Rule were actions by the High Representative and the Federal 
government in Sarajevo that economically crippled the institutions running Home Rule. 
While firing executive boards in public companies loyal to the Home Rule was one way 
to cripple it, the straw that broke the camel’s back was the case of Hercegovačka Banka 
(Herzegovinian Bank). 
 The Herzegovinian Bank ran more than one third of all transactions in the 
Federation and it was largely a Croat bank closely associated with the CDU, and thus also 
with Home Rule. On 6
th
 of April 2001 SFOR units entered the bank and blew up the 
safes, confiscating all the equipment and money.
114
 Tens of thousands of Croats lost their 
life savings and a few thousand mostly Croat businesses also lost their capital.
115
 Croats 
were shocked by this event, and it deepened the mistrust about the intentions of 
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international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that remains today.
116
 Without 
financial resources and backing provided through the bank, Home Rule crumbled. The 
leader of the CDC and Home Rule, Ante Jelavić, who was the acting Croat member of 
the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Presidency at the time, was dismissed from his function by 
the High Representative in March 2001, despite being democratically elected and 
receiving a majority of Croat votes in the past elections.
117
  
Instead of Jelavić, Jozo Križanović, a member of the SDP, a Bosniak-dominated 
party which received very few Croat votes, was elected as new Croat member of the 
Presidency in the Parliament vote. He received only 6 out of 42 votes, and only two of 
those votes were Croat votes.
118
 Jelavić was also banned from assuming public office or 
any other political activity until 2009, and subsequently he moved to Croatia and is living 
there now. Quite a few Croats were not only furious because of these decisions, they 
were also disheartened by the failure of Home Rule, and since its failure, their political 
position became increasingly worse every year. Croats have been politically marginalized 
due to the decisions and amendments made by the High Representatives. These decisions 
were often politically abused by Bosniaks in the Federation.  
The High Representatives did not necessarily have malicious intentions toward 
the Croats, nor are the Serbs and Bosniaks happy with all of their decisions. The OHR 
decisions are primarily based on the assumption that if they reduce the political rights of 
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the three Peoples and encourage the creation of an overarching Bosnian identity, the three 
ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina may overcome their differences, leaving the 
past behind and embracing Western-style multiculturalism in the process. The goal of 
these policies was the establishment of a more centralized and stable Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Sadly, while this sounds good in theory, due to the political realities of 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian political and social life, these decisions were often abused by the 
more numerous Bosniaks in the Federation. Because of their numbers and the nature of 
the amended electoral laws, Bosniaks usurped Croat political rights and positions in the 
Federation. Hopefully, the OHR will soon realize that only through the decentralization, 
federalization and true respect of collective political rights will progress be made in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The liberal-democracy unitary state model cannot work in a 
multiethnic country such as Bosnia and Herzegovina.                                 
An analysis of the amendments to the Federal Constitution 
 The Federal constitution between 1994 and 2008 was amended 109 times, and 
around two thirds of those amendments were simply imposed by the OHR, while only 
one third actually followed the regular procedure in the Federal Parliament.
119
 A lot of 
those amendments eroded Croat political rights and eventually brought them into today’s 
position in which they are second-class citizens. Today’s Constitution of the Federation is 
almost unrecognizable in comparison to the original treaty signed in 1994 in Washington 
which stopped the Croat-Bosniak conflict. It is unlikely that Croats would have ever 
accepted Washington Treaty if they knew how much the Federal Constitution would be 
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amended.
120
 For example, the original Washington Treaty, which includes the 
Constitution of the Federation, also said that the Republic of Croatia and the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina may enter into confederation, which was done as a 
compromise in order to compel Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats into signing the treaty and 
allow them to indirectly join Croatia through this confederation.
121
 However, this was 
never realized, and some may feel that Croats were tricked into signing the Treaty with 
this promise that international community never expected to be implemented.  
Furthermore, adding Serbs as constituent Peoples in the Federation did not only 
leave room for political games like Bosniaks getting elected as Serb representatives, but it 
is also highly absurd.
122
 Serbs did not take any part in the creation of the Federation, and 
Serb leadership was actually militarily engaged against the Federation until the Dayton 
Agreement. The original Federation was supposed to be bigger (58% in contrast to 
today’s 51%), and contained more Croat ethnic space in Northern Bosnia.123 The 
amendments of the Federal constitution that really put Croats in an unequal position were 
amendments between 2002 and 2006, including amendments mentioned in the previous 
section. 
 Cantons were originally even more autonomous than they are today. They were 
originally in charge of police, education, culture, taxes, energy, public services, land 
policies and media, as well as most of legal matters.
124
 Some of these were gradually 
transferred to the Federal level, and some Federal level authorities were transferred to the 
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state level, thus creating more centralized Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, something that Croats and Serbs have always dreaded. For 
example, even today there is an unconstitutional Ministry of Education on the Federal 
level created by the OHR, even though the Constitutional Court decided that the 
education is in the jurisdiction of Cantons, and in some cases of Croat municipalities in 
Bosniak Cantons, even on the municipal level.
125
 Furthermore, foreign policy, defense 
and customs were originally on entity level, but all of these were later transferred to the 
state level.
126
 Again, this creates fear of further centralization of not only the whole 
country, but also the Federation itself which might very easily become de facto Bosniak 
entity instead of a Croat-Bosniak entity if the Cantons lose their original powers and 
functions.  
 As explained earlier, the number of seats in the House of Representatives was 
reduced, much against Croat wishes. The House of Peoples, the only way that Croats 
could protect their national interests, is so changed that today Bosniaks can easily prevent 
Croats from being able to use veto powers in the house by electing 6 out of 17 Croat 
members, thus making the Federation a de facto Bosniak entity in which Croats cannot 
wield any political power. In the most bizarre episode of modern Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
history, in March 2011, the president of the Federation and his deputies were elected in 
the House of Peoples, despite having only 5 votes from the Croat Club, even though the 
constitution says that in order to elect the president and his deputies, at least one third of 
members of each Club in the House of Peoples has to vote for them.
127
 This law is in 
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place to prevent election of the president and deputies that do not have support of their 
respective ethnic groups in the House of Peoples. Everyone with even the most 
rudimentary math skills can easily calculate that at least one third of 17 is 6, not 5.  
Croats complained to the Central Electoral Commission, which declared this 
election unconstitutional. Nonetheless, for reasons known only to him, High 
Representative Inzko simply decided to suspend this decision, and allowed the formation 
of the Federal government in 2011 which not only lacked Croat support and legitimacy, 
but was also unconstitutional.
128
 In reaction, Croats started using “5≠17/3” as a sign of 
protest against the High Representative Inzko and the illegitimate Federal government, 
showing their distain by putting signs with this mathematical expression around Mostar 
on the 25
th
 of November 2013, the official Bosnian-Herzegovinian Statehood Day, which 
is often not celebrated by Croats.
129
   
 Originally, the Federal government had 11 ministries, 4 ministers without 
portfolios, a president of the Federation and his deputy, who was also a minister, and who 
had to be Croat if president was Bosniak, and vice versa.
130
 Bosniaks had 7 ministries and 
3 ministries without portfolio, while Croats were allocated 5 ministries and 1 ministry 
without portfolio. Also, every minister had a deputy who was from a different ethnic 
group, keeping them in check and preventing them from making decisions that might be 
malicious towards other ethnic groups. This changed through the amendments because 
Serbs were now also constituent People in the Federation. Now, Federal government had 
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16 regular ministries, 8 of which are allocated to the Bosniaks, 5 to the Croats and 3 to 
the Serbs. Also, deputy minister positions ceased to exist. This was bad for Croats, who 
cannot check decisions by more numerous Bosniak ministers.
131
 Furthermore, while 
decisions were previously made by a consensus that involved both Croats and Bosniaks, 
after the amendments by the OHR, the government only needs one half of all ministers to 
vote in order to pass a decision. In practice this means that Bosniaks can pass decisions 
even if the Croat and Serb ministers do not agree with them.
132
 Also, Serb ministers are 
often elected from Bosniak and pro-Bosniak parties, further intensifying Bosniak power 
in the executive branch of Federal government in the process. 
 Even more worrisome is the fact that even the Constitutional Court is not immune 
to these political games and the outvoting that came into existence due to amendments 
put forward by the OHR. Judges on the Federal constitutional court are elected by a 
simple majority in the House of Peoples, which means that Croat judges can be elected 
without any support from major Croat parties, due to the fact that Bosniak parties do not 
only control the Bosniak Club, but also quite often Serb and Others Clubs, giving them a 
vast majority in this house.
133
 Also, the Federal constitutional court now, after 
amendments, has nine members, and it needs five votes to accept or decline a motion. 
The amended constitution says that out of nine judges, at least two shall be Croat, Serb 
and Bosniak, and one “Other”. This means that it is possible to have four Bosniak judges, 
which can with one Other judge, who is usually elected by Bosniaks in the parliament, 
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form majority (five out of nine) in the constitutional court.
134
 This means that Croat 
political will and interests can not only be ignored in legislative and executive branches 
of the Federal government, but also in juridical branch as well, which is especially 
worrying. Also, it is important to note that out of 34 judges of the Supreme Court in 
March 2012, only three of them were actually Croat, again putting Croat interests in 
danger.
135
 
 Moreover, it is strange that all the positions in public institutions, which have 
ethnic quotas and reserve spots for ethnic groups, are actually set according to the census 
from 1991. Taking into consideration how drastically the ethnic map of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has changed because of the war, it leaves us with “Croat officials” being 
elected from places where Croats were ethnically cleansed during the war and where they 
did not return in great numbers.
136
 Furthermore, two “mixed cantons” enjoyed special 
rights and laws, with the aim of protecting both Croats and Bosniaks in these cantons 
from being dominated by the other group. Through amendments, these special statuses 
were revoked, which is worrying because of the bad position of Croats in the Central 
Bosnia Canton, where the ratio used to be almost 1:1 between Croats and Bosniaks, but 
today is closer to 1:1.5, thanks to the fact that many Croats could not return or chose not 
to return to their homes after the war.
137
  
 Finally, on the Federal level, Mostar, the city with the highest number of Croats 
and their cultural and academic center in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has a special status 
that was imposed by the OHR. Its electoral law divides Mostar into 7 districts, 3 on the 
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“Croat side”, 3 on the “Bosniak side” and one in the center that cannot directly elect 
representatives at all. All of the 6 neighborhoods elect 3 representatives each, despite the 
fact that one of them on the Croat (Western) side of the city has four times as many 
people as one of the neighborhoods on the Bosniak (Eastern) side of the city.
138
 This is 
especially puzzling because Travnik, the seat of the other mixed Canton, which was also 
a significant site of Croat-Bosniak War, does not have this special status.
139
 It is not hard 
to figure out why Croats are dissatisfied with such a position of Mostar, which they treat 
as their capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and which has a Croat majority today. 
 Therefore, the political position of Croats in the Federation is almost unbearable 
after all the amendments, especially the ones between 2002 and 2006. Still, the Croat 
positon on the state level is not so bad, and they are relatively equal with the other two 
ethnic groups, except for the electoral laws for Presidency that were already abused twice 
by Bosniak voters and politicians, which is the topic of my next section. The only other 
problem at the state level is the fact that originally Bosnia and Herzegovina was way less 
centralized. Today, Bosniaks (who will probably soon make up more than 50% of the 
total population) are calling for more centralized Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such 
centralized Bosnia and Herzegovina could then be dominated by Bosniak political power 
through their sheer number. For example, according to research conducted in 2010, more 
than 80% of Bosniaks support a centralized state without any cantons or entities.
140
 In 
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contrast, 70% of Croats support three entities solution, while 80% of Serbs support 
secession of Republika Srpska and a merger between this entity and Serbia.
141
   
The Dayton Peace Agreement was amended only once, and all the additional 
powers that the state level assumed from the entities did not come through constitutional 
reforms, but rather through decisions of the OHR.
142
 This puts Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in a weird position where the present state structure is unconstitutional, one example 
including having a defense ministry and state army rather than entity armies as it is 
written in the Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
143
 Still, the real problem for 
Croats lies within the Federation, because this is the level of administrative division in 
which they lost their entire political agency, while they lost only some minor ones on the 
state level.  
When one looks back at the original Washington agreement on which Croats 
agreed, and the present state of the Federation, the difference is staggering. It is probable 
that Croats, if they knew what would happen to the Federation over time due to the OHR 
amendments and decisions, would have never signed the Washington Treaty and would 
rather take chance with the war they were losing then effectively signing away their 
freedoms and rights. The period between 2002 and 2006 elections was, except for these 
amendments, rather uneventful and Croats did not attempt to stage another Home Rule, 
also due to the fact that their legitimate parties were part of the government during this 
period. The true agony for Croats started with the 2006 elections, when for the first time 
voting rights were so misused that Bosniaks managed to elect both Bosniak and Croat 
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members of the tripartite Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same thing also 
happened in 2010, when Bosniak parties also usurped all the power on the Federal level, 
and something similar was attempted in 2014, but did not succeed due to the reasons that 
I will explain later on in this paper. 
The phenomenon of Željko Komšić 
The elections in 2006, held on the 1
st
 of October, were marked by a controversy 
that is still often discussed, and which showed that Croats lack proper laws and 
protections that would allow them to elect their own representatives. On this day Željko 
Komšić was elected as a Crotian member of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Presidency, which is 
made up from three members: one representative of Croats elected in the Federation, one 
representative of Bosniaks also elected in the Federation, and one representative of Serbs 
elected in Republika Srpska. Komšić, who is an ethnic Croat from Sarajevo and who is a 
highly decorated ABH soldier, was nominated by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 
his presidential bid. The Social Democratic Party, as already noted, is a reformed 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian Communist Party from the Yugoslavian era, and as such, by its 
definition it is a left-leaning party, in contrast to most other parties in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina which are center-right and right parties. Still, even though SDP is a 
nominally multiethnic “Bosnian party,”144 its members and voters are largely Bosniaks.  
                                                          
144
 “Bosnian”, “civil” or sometimes “patriotic” party are colloquial terms in Bosnian-Herzegovinian  
political life for parties that support the idea of a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina and reject divisions based 
on ethnicity. The SDP is the most prominent example of such a party. These parties want Bosnian-
Herzegovinian citizens to start identifying as Bosnians rather than as Bosniaks, Croats or Serbs, in order to 
overcome divisions in society. Because of the specific role that ethnic groups play in the political life of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, this call for a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina is problematic and can be easily 
misused to promote Bosniak nationalistic ideas disguised as pro-unitary and pro-liberal ones. 
49 
 
In his analysis of 2010 general elections, sociologist Ivan Vukoja estimated that 
SDP has support of some 1.5% of Serb voters, 2.5% of Croat voters, and a staggering 
27.5% of Bosniak voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
145
 This shows that even though 
SDP promotes the ideas of a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina without ethnic divisions 
and claim that they are not a Bosniak party, close to 90% of their voters are Bosniaks and 
they do not enjoy much support from the other two groups. Such a unitary state that SDP 
propose would function as a typical democracy in most Europeans national states, and 
because of it, Croats and Serbs are afraid that the more numerous Bosniaks would 
outvote them and elect their own representatives, as it happened with Komšić in 2006 and 
2010. Vukoja also claims that the unitary state policy of the SDP is just a Bosniak 
nationalistic policy of a unitary state that would dominate disguised as a pro-Bosnian and 
liberal option that overlooks ethnic divisions.
146
    
In the 2002 elections, Croat member of the Presidency Dragan Čović got close to 
115,000 votes, or almost 62% of all “Croat” votes in Bosnia and Herzegovina out of 
some 187,000 votes casted for Croat members of the Presidency.
147
 In 2006 Komšić 
received just over 116,000 votes, or just under 40% of all votes for Croat member of the 
Presidency.
148
 The CDU’s candidate won 77,000 and a candidate of the CDU 1990, a 
splinter faction of CDU that was formed earlier in 2006 as an independent party, won 
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over 53,000 votes.
149
 Together with other candidates, over 293,000 voters voted for Croat 
member of the Presidency. This is some 106,000 more votes than only four years ago, 
which raised quite a few questions of where these votes came from.  
It is important to note that other Croat candidates won in all the municipalities 
with a Croat majority, while Komšić won the majority of votes in only two 
municipalities.
150
 One of them is the mostly Serb municipality in Western Bosnia which 
has around 3,000 people, and the other one is Gračanica, a largely Bosniak-populated 
municipality in North Bosnia. This municipality, which has around 50,000 people, almost 
all of them Bosniaks, had only 132 Croats, or less than 0.3% in 1991 (and probably even 
less today).
151
 When we take this in consideration, it quickly becomes obvious that 
Komšić got a majority of his votes from Bosniak voters rather than Croats, despite him 
being elected as a Croat member of the Presidency. Quite ironically, some western 
journalists, who are not familiar enough with the complex political situation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, celebrated Komšić’s victory as a hope for post-ethnic Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, overlooking the fact that the Croat right to elect their member of the 
Presidency was usurped by more numerous Bosniaks.
152
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The electoral manipulation was even more obvious in the 2010 elections, held on 
the 3
rd
 of October. Running again to be a Croat member of the Presidency, Komšić won 
staggering 337,000 votes, or 60% of all votes cast for the post.
153
 The CDU candidate 
Borjana Krišto won 110,000 votes, and other Croat candidates had another 110,000 votes 
cast for them.
154
 This means that more than 557,000 voters in the Federation voted for 
Croat members of the Presidency. In contrast, all Bosniak candidates won around 
466,000 votes, or some 90,000 votes less than Croat candidates.
155
 Bearing in mind that 
Bosniaks are almost four times as numerous as Croats in the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, it is obvious that those 557,000 votes cast for Croat candidates could not all 
come from Croat voters. Moreover, even by most generous estimations, it is estimated 
that there are around 450,000 to 500,000 Croats in the Federation.
156
 This means that 
even if all eligible Croats voted (doubtful, as the number of Croat voters in the Federation 
is usually between 180,000 and 220,000), there is still a question of where the other 
200,000 votes came from. This question can be easily answered by examining the 
municipalities from which Željko Komšić got most of his votes. 
Komšić did not win most votes in any municipality in the Federation which has a 
Croat majority, while it got the majority of all votes cast in a vast majority of 
municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that have Bosniak majority.
157
 For example, in 
Kalesija, a municipality of some 35,000 people, Komšić won over 7,000 votes. At the 
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same time, other Croat candidates together won 33 votes.
158
 It is estimated that between 
93% and 99% of Kalesija’s population are Bosniaks, and they were only 35 Croats in 
Kalesija in 1991 (or less than 0.1%).
159
 Just looking at this municipality and taking the 
above information into consideration, it is obvious that Komšić won thanks to Bosniak 
votes. It is estimated that out of 337,000 of votes that Komšić got in 2010 elections, 
Croats gave him some 4,500 votes, or just over 1.3% of all votes he received.
160
 When we 
take into consideration that this means that he got support of only 2.3% of all Croat 
voters, it becomes obvious that he was elected without support of Croats in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and thus lacks legitimacy to represent Croats in the Presidency, despite 
being legally elected according to the current electoral laws.
161
 Actually, Komšić has 
almost become a symbol of inequality and the lack of political power for Croats in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
It is important to note that Komšić is not the only Croat representative elected 
without Croat votes or support. In Republika Srpska, which has a Serb entity president 
and Croat and Bosniak vice-presidents, in 2010 Emil Vlajki was elected as a Croat vice-
president with 6,000 votes, most of them non-Croat voters.
162
 This was some 500 more 
than the next Croat candidate and Vlajki became vice-president of Republika Srpska, 
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despite not having Croat legitimacy and not being elected by Croats. Still, this was only 
on the entity level rather than state level, and the case of Željko Komšić is more 
important than that of Vlajki, because 95% of Croats live in the Federation where Croat 
and Bosniak members of the Presidency for the state level are being elected.
163
 Moreover, 
even Bosniak diplomats like Mr. Arifhodžić represent themselves as Croats in order to 
get diplomatic positions reserved for Croats, as one third of all diplomatic posts are 
reserved for Croats, showing how easy it is to manipulate the system and usurp Croats 
rights.
164
  
The problem of Komšić’s election was not only in the fact that he got elected 
without Croat support, but also in the way that questions about legality and the legitimacy 
of Komšić’s election were discussed in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian academic community. 
For example, Eldar Sarajlić, a respected Bosnian--Herzegovinian political scientists and 
philosopher, has argued that the election of Mr. Komšić can be seen as a positive trend, 
because he was elected by Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens who reject ethnic divisions, 
and he is not the only one who supports such an argument.
165
 I find this argument to be 
either naïve or very cynical, because of the very nature and history of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic country. Sarajlić argues that it is everyone’s right to decide 
what ethnicity they are, and that no one has the right to tell to the Komšić’s voters that 
they cannot constitute the Croat ethnic group in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
166
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I find Sarajlić’s argument to be the prime example of demagogy that occurs when 
such a complicated political matter as the election of Komšić is abstracted to the 
theoretical level, without taking into consideration the political realities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and its turbulent past. While I do think that everyone should have the right 
to self-identify themselves, this liberal right can easily be turned into a political weapon 
that denies certain ethnic groups political rights and freedom to choose their 
representatives in multi-ethnic countries. The best example of this would be the elections 
of Željko Komšić as the Croat member of the Presidency without Croat support. In 
practice, that is a clear usurpation of power for political ends, and not any exercise in 
self-identification and liberalism. If Komšić, as a candidate for the Croat member of the 
Presidency, got less than 5,000 Croat votes, in contrast with the other candidate that got 
110,000 Croat votes, then he clearly does not have the support of Croats in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. It is very unlikely that those Bosniak voters who voted for Komšić, and a 
number of whom, ironically, probably fought Croats as members of ABH during the war, 
declared themselves ethnically Croat and their native language as Croatian on the 2013 
census. After all, even Komšić, who is supposed to represent Croats, officially said that 
his native language is Bosnian (which is spoken by Bosniaks) rather than Croatian.
167
  
Another Bosnian-Herzegovinian academic, Asim Mujkić, argues that the one 
man, one vote principle of the SDP’s proposed unitary Bosnian-Herzegovinian state is 
the most democratic principle, because it would allow people to vote also based on their 
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associations to other groups (such as class), rather than just their ethnic group.
168
 This 
principle of a liberal democratic state, which is often the case in European national states, 
works well on an abstract level (as does Komšić’s election), but is just candy-coated 
Bosniak nationalism once we project it onto political realities. The war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina during 1990s was fought between three ethnic groups who tried to establish 
and dominate “their” ethnic areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina (often expanded and 
consolidated through ethnic cleansing by all three sides), and not between higher and 
lower classes or supporters of one football club over another. Therefore, it is ridiculous to 
say that belonging to a specific class or other group can be more important to a majority 
of people in the political reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina than the ethnicity of 
politicians and their voters. Thus, the election of Komšić was clearly an electoral 
manipulation of existing laws and very harmful for political rights of Croats in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
Why the election of “Komšić Mark 2” failed 
Because the law limits members of the Presidency to only two terms, Komšić 
could not run again in the 2014 elections held on October 12. In 2013 Komšić founded 
Democratic Front (DF), social democratic party which is a splinter party of the SDP. 
Soon, many members of the SDP left the SDP for the DF. Only four candidates were 
nominated for Croat member of the Presidency: Dragan Čović, leader of the CDU of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croat member of the Presidency between 2002 and 2006, 
Martin Raguž, leader of the CDU 1990, and two minor candidates, one from a minor 
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Croat/Bosnian party and another one nominated by Komšić’s DF. The DF also nominated 
a candidate for Bosniak president, and they were the only party that had more than one 
candidate, while all the other parties supported just one.
169
 Čović, who was supported by 
the CDU and some minor Croat parties, won 128,000 votes, and Raguž nominated by the 
CDU 1990 almost won 95,000 votes, while two other candidates won 15,000 and 7,000 
votes respectively.
170
 This means that there were 245,000 votes cast for the Croat 
member of the Presidency, less than half of the votes cast in the 2010 elections, which 
also points that Komšić was elected by Bosniak votes. At the same time all Bosniak 
candidates won some 753,000 votes, way more than in 2010.  
While the DF’s candidate for the Croat member of the Presidency obviously won 
only 7,000 votes, their candidate for the Bosniak member of the Presidency won 114,000 
votes and was not elected. There were still electoral manipulations on part of the 
Bosniaks that wanted to prevent Čović, who is an advocate of the further federalization of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, from getting elected. Martin Raguž, leader of the CDU 1990, a 
party which since its formation in 2006 was seen as a center-right alternative party for 
Croat voters disappointed in the inefficient CDU which failed to improve the political 
position of Croats in the Federation, changed his rhetoric a few months before the 
elections. His rhetoric became less Croat centre-right rhetoric and closer to the rhetoric of 
Bosniak parties, in contrast to the somewhat hard-liner rhetoric by the CDU and Čović.171 
No wonder that he was seen as less of two evils to many voters that dread Čović’s calls 
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for the formation of a third entity with a Croat majority. Even during his campaign, 
Bosniak First Bosnian-Herzegovinian Party leader Šeherezada Delić promised that her 
20,000 members will vote for Raguž on the next elections, despite members of her party 
being almost all Bosniaks.
172
  
Even though Raguž lost and Čović was elected Croat member of the Presidency, 
Bosniak votes that Raguž received show that just due to mere chance and fragmentation 
on Bosniak political scene (record ten candidates ran for Bosniak member of the 
Presidency) Croats managed to actually elect their legitimate candidate into the office 
that was usurped for eight years. An analysis performed by the Institute for Political and 
Social Research from Mostar showed that around 52% of Raguž’s votes, or over 49,000 
votes, were cast by Bosniaks rather than Croats.
173
 For example, Raguž received roughly 
three times less votes in three Croat cantons and in Croat municipalities in the two mixed 
cantons than Čović.174 On the other hand, in Bosniak cantons, Raguž won three times as 
many votes as Čović, and also eight times as many votes as his party (CDU 1990), which 
brings us to the conclusion that at least 50% of all his votes were casted by Bosniaks 
rather than Croats.
175
 For example, in Bosnia-Podrinje Canton, where there are less than 
one hundred Croats, Čović won 43 votes, while Raguž won 564 votes. At the same time 
Raguž’s party CDU 1990 won only one vote in this Canton. This means that Raguž 
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received 564 times as many votes as his party, which point to the abuses of the electoral 
laws by the Bosniaks.
176
  
It was only due to pure luck that Bosniak candidates for Presidency were more 
numerous than ever (making Bosniak voter body more fragmented in the process) that 
this time Croats managed to elect their own legitimate representative for the Presidency. 
Also, the Croat vice-President of Republika Srpska was actually elected by Croat votes, 
denying Emil Vlajki another term of usurping the Croat position.
177
 Still, it is evident that 
the election law has to be changed, because on the next elections Bosniaks might again 
choose Croat member of the Presidency.      
The unconstitutional usurpation of Croat political positions in the Federation  
In 2010 elections the CDU got 112,000 votes in the Federation, while the CDU 
1990 coalition, which included the right-wing Croatian Party of Rights, won 50,000 
votes.
178
 The People’s Party for Work and Betterment, a party run by the Croat tycoon 
Lijanović family which received quite a few Bosniak votes, got 49,000 votes.179 As 
mentioned earlier, the SDP and the Party for Democratic Action, together with two minor 
Croat parties, the Croatian Party of Rights and the People’s Party for Work and 
Betterment created a coalition on the Federal level, the so-called “Platform.” The CDU 
and the CDU 1990 were not part of this government that was formed in March 2011, 
even though it is estimated that they won more than 85% of Croat votes in the 
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Federation.
180
 The government was formed despite the fact that they needed one third 
support in the Croat Club in the Federal House of Peoples.  
This coalition had only five votes out of 17 Croats in the House of Peoples, all of 
them elected in Bosniak cantons by Bosniak votes. Still, according to the constitution 
they needed six votes, and the Central Electoral Committee proclaimed the new 
government illegal. This decision was suspended by High Representative Valentin Inzko, 
who said that they had enough votes, because apparently five is one third of 17, and in 
this surreal episode of Bosnian-Herzegovinian political history, as noted earlier, allowed 
usurpation of Croat political rights not only in the Presidency, but also on the Federal 
level. Because of the fact that the Federal government was formed without parties that 
had Croat support, much like in 2001, the CDU and the CDU 1990 said that they would 
not accept any decisions made by this government, which was thus crippled from the 
start.
181
 
It is interesting to note that in the state parliament, both the CDU and the CDU 
1990 were part of the majority coalition. This fact points out the fact that the real problem 
for Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not the state constitution, but the heavily 
amended Federal constitution. This is especially evident when taking into consideration 
that the state level has relatively few powers in comparison to entities, and 95% of Croats 
live in the Federation, the bigger out of two entities. As a response to the formation of the 
Federal government without Croat parties, the CDU and the CDU 1990, together with 
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some other minor Croat parties, revived the Croatian National Assembly (CNA) in April 
2011, in what some journalists described as a bomb that can potentially explode and 
destroy Bosnia and Herzegovina.
182
 Still, this time, Home Rule was not proclaimed, but 
rather the CNA is trying to reform Bosnia and Herzegovina and secure an entity for 
Croats through legal means. The formation of the CNA raised some anxieties about its 
aims, because the memories of Home Rule are still fresh.  
In 2014 all the pfarties of the CNA, except for the CDU 1990, jointly formed a list 
for elections, centered around the CDU and its candidates.
183
 As already mentioned, the 
CNA/CDU candidate Čović became the new Croat member of the Presidency in the 2014 
elections held on the 12
th
 of October. The CNA list won majority votes in every single 
municipality with a Croat majority, having support mirroring the support that CDU 
enjoyed in the early 1990s.
184
 In the state parliament they have four representatives in 
both the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples, while the only other Croat 
party, the CDU 1990 has only one representative in both houses respectively.
185
 Also, on 
the Federal level the CDU as leader of the CNA coalition won 13 seats in the Federal 
House of Representatives, and 13 seats in the House of Peoples. In contrast, the CDU 
1990 has 4 and 1 seats, respectively, while the other three Croat seats in the House of 
Peoples are from non-Croat parties.
186
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This means that any future Federal government cannot be formed without 
CDU/CNA support, because this time not even High Representative Inzko could make a 
claim that three or four is one third of 17. Therefore, there were vigorous negotiations 
between the CDU, the Party for Democratic Action (PDA) and the DF in forming the 
Federal government, and the government formed on 31
st
 of March, but due to the 
ideological differences of these parties will have problems remaining functional.
187
 The 
CDU calls for the entity or federal unit with a Croat majority, while the PDA and the DF 
are against it and they want to create either a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina, or preserve 
the current status quo. Bakir Izetbegović, the son of Alija Izetbegović and leader of the 
PDA has said that he would not allow a Croat federal unit nor even a TV channel in the 
Croatian language, because according to him, that would be further division of an 
(already divided) country based on ethnic borders.
188
 And while other multiethnic 
European countries, such as Belgium or Switzerland, have found solutions to protect all 
ethnic groups and give them equal rights, the “Croat issue” still troubles Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
The CDU leader and CNA president Čović said on the 28th of February 2015 
during the latest session of CNA that further federalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
the only way out of the political crisis and the only path that would ensure Croats that 
their political will not be violated in the future.
189
 Croats are very unsatisfied with the 
current situation and rightfully so. During two weeks of February of 2011, more than 
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140,000 Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a petition against the political 
marginalization of Croats, and asked for their political rights to be respected.
190
 They are 
not only unsatisfied with the political situation, but also with the economic one, which is 
a byproduct of the way taxes work in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which I will analyze in 
the next section.  
Even the European Parliament discouraged the unitary tendencies of some 
Bosniak and pro-Bosnian politicians, and called for equality of Croats in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
191
 European Parliament members from Croatia actively drew attention to 
the problems that Croats face in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one possible solution is the 
further federalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina which would give Croats their own 
federal unit, making sure that they can elect their own representatives.
192
 Quite simply, 
the present situation in the Federation is not sustainable much longer, both economically 
and politically, and a new solution must be found soon. For example, the Federal minister 
of War Veterans in the last government was a Bosniak politician closely associated with 
the people that ethnically cleansed Croats from Bugojno and which run some of the 331 
concentration camps for Croats that were present in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 
war.
193
 Recently, the CDU delegate in the Bugojno municipal council was verbally 
attacked by a Bosniak member of the council, a cousin of the Federal minister Helez, and 
he was threatened that Croats would be again slaughtered in Bugojno, as they were 
                                                          
190
 “Preko 140.000 Potpisa Protiv ‘Majorizacije Hrvata,’” RadioSarajevo.ba, March 3, 2011, 
http://www.radiosarajevo.ba/novost/46215. 
191
 “Rezolucija Europskog Parlamenta,” IDPI, February 11, 2014, http://www.idpi.ba/rezolucija-europskog-
parlamenta/. 
192
 “EU Treba Novi Pristup Prema Bosni I Hercegovini,” IDPI, January 29, 2014, http://www.idpi.ba/eu-
treba-novi-pristup-prema-bosni-i-hercegovini/. 
193
 Zlatko Tulić, “Hrvati U Ratu U BiH Mučeni U 331 Logoru, a Za 20 Godina Sudilo Se Za Slučajeve Iz 
Dva,” www.vecernji.ba, May 31, 2014, http://www.vecernji.ba/hrvati-u-ratu-u-bih-muceni-u-331-logoru-a-
za-20-godina-sudilo-se-za-slucajeve-iz-dva-942060. 
63 
 
during the war.
194
 This one episode just shows the type of problems Croats face in the 
Federation today, and why a reform is necessary if they want to enjoy the same rights as 
Bosniaks and Serbs. 
Another problem with the current system is the fact that it is highly complicated, 
illogical and overly expensive and bureaucratic. For example, in the last elections only 13 
Serbs were initially elected into the Federal House of Peoples, instead of the required 17, 
because there were simply not enough Serbs in cantonal assemblies.
195
 Another example 
that shows all the complexity and expensiveness of the current Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
political apparatus is the fact that there are 13 prime ministers in the country (10 cantons, 
2 entities and state level), and in total 569 members of various parliaments and 
governments, and this is only in the Federation and Cantons, without counting the state 
level, Republika Srpska and Brčko District.196 For a country of barely 3.7 million people, 
all these officials plus their deputies, secretaries, drivers and other staff is simply too 
much of a burden to carry, especially in a country where unemployment is close to 
44%.
197
 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially the overcomplicated Federation, is 
simply too bureaucratic and expensive to be sustainable without substantial foreign aid. 
This becomes even more evident once we start to look at taxes and the way they are 
distributed, which is another reason why Croats want reforms of the Federation or their 
own entity.  
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Taxes, census, demonstrations and the current state 
 Two entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina function like mini-countries; the unitary 
Republika Srpska and the complex Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Taxes in the 
Federation, and the way they are run create a lot of anti-Sarajevo (the Federation’s 
capital) sentiment, not only in Croat cantons, but also in some Bosniak cantons, which 
call for a fairer system and less centralization.
198
 In only eight years between 2006 and 
2013, the Sarajevo Canton received 1.2 billion Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible 
Marks more than it paid through Federal indirect taxes. From all the tax revenues that the 
Federation collects, 36.2% is used to finance Federal institutions, 51.48% is used to 
finance Cantons, 8.42% is used to finance municipalities and 3.9% is used to finance 
roads.
199
 Those 51.48% for financing cantons is then divided, from a joint account, and 
sent to every canton. The amount that they receive is based on the population, number of 
elementary and high school students, and to a less extent, area of the canton in km
2
. This 
number is then multiplied by the coefficient, which is normally one, except for the two 
poorest (Croat) cantons where the coefficient is 1.1 and 1.5, and the smallest Bosniak 
canton with the coefficient 1.8, in order to offset underdevelopment of these cantons.  
Sarajevo’s coefficient is 2 because of its Federal capital status, which when 
translated into revenues means that Sarajevo receives 30% of all Federal tax income 
revenues for Cantons. This means that Sarajevo and Bosnia-Podrinje cantons receive 
roughly double the tax revenues per capita than other cantons. The Institute for Social 
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and Political research has calculated that just in the last eight years, through this tax 
system, Croat cantons have lost 120.9 million Marks, and two mixed cantons have lost 
336.9 million Marks, which means that Croats paid roughly 300 million Marks in taxes 
then were than given for the development of predominately Bosniak Sarajevo.
200
 If 
Croats had their own political unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they could be reassured 
that their taxes are used for development of Croat municipalities, rather than redirected 
towards Sarajevo. 
 Still, the borders of such units are not easily determined in Central Bosnia, but 
they can be, once the ethnic breakdown of results of the 2013 census, the first official 
census after 1991, is published in June 2015.
201
 Still, there are genuine fears that more 
people were recorded than actually live in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for political purposes 
and manipulation. Even so, the number of 3.7 million is likely to decrease close to more 
realistic 3.4 million through additional checks, and this census will finally give us 
important information about the Bosnian-Herzegovinian population and changes in ethnic 
structure and distribution that resulted from the war. Likely, the census will show that 
most municipalities have a 80+% majority of one of the three ethnic groups, and that few 
mixed municipalities are actually divided between Croat and Bosniak parts. Nonetheless, 
the census and its results will be important tools in determining possible reforms in the 
internal structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 Hopefully, the census results and the fact that neither Federal nor state 
government can be formed without Croats this time should be used as a basis for 
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territorial reorganization, whose proposals I will tackle in the next section. Only once the 
political situation is solved and all three ethnic groups have equal rights, as well as 
national minorities, it will be possible to tackle the economic and social problems that 
plague Bosnia and Herzegovina. As I wrote in my column, poverty, emigration and 
radicalization of certain Islamic elements in Bosnia and Herzegovina are plaguing the 
country.
202
 Unemployment is at 44%, even though it is likely that the real number is over 
50%, and young and educated people are leaving the country. Just in 2014 68,000 people 
emigrated from Bosnia and Herzegovina, a staggering 2%, and this trend is likely to 
continue, especially amongst Croats who have Croatian passports and can freely travel 
across the EU.
203
 Finally, it is estimated that a few hundred young radical Wahhabi 
fighters have left Bosnia and Herzegovina for Iraq and Syria, and the real danger is in 
possible attacks that these people might commit in Bosnia and Herzegovina once they 
come back, thus raising already high ethnic tensions. In order for Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
society to effectively tackle these issues, first there have to be political changes that 
would give Croats equal rights and return their fate in the future of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Otherwise, Bosnia and Herzegovina might face social unrests that can 
easily spiral into ethnic conflict, as almost happened in February 2014. 
 In February 2014, spontaneous protests in larger Bosniak towns and cities, like 
Tuzla and Sarajevo, nearly grew into social movements that demanded changes in 
government and better living opportunities. The protesters clashed with police in multiple 
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towns, and even burned Cantonal government buildings in Mostar and Tuzla. They also, 
sadly, burned down a section of the Presidency building in Sarajevo together with the 
official Archive of Bosnia and Herzegovina, destroying thousands of historical 
documents in the process.
204
 This is so called the “Bosnian Spring”, which did not really 
catch on in Serb and Croat parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite all three sides being 
similarly impoverished. What was worrying is that many protesters in Bosniak towns in 
the Federation called for the abolition of Cantons, justifying it with saving money on the 
administration and organizing the Federation and then all of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 
centralized liberal democracy.
205
 The fear of many Croats voiced in the media is that the 
protests, which started as social unrest due to poverty, are turning into political protests 
that aim to abolish Cantons, the only level of three main levels of government in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina where Croats can still freely elect their representatives without fear of 
someone manipulating elections or outvoting them. This really showed that although a 
liberal unitary post-ethnic state sounds very appealing as an idea, in reality, it would just 
further diminish Croat, and also consequently Serb, rights. Given political realities of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, this idea is far from liberal, it is very close to the rightist 
Bosniak nationalist rhetoric from the 1990s, disguised under quasi-liberal rhetoric. 
 In the research conducted in November 2013 on 1,200 people, political scientist 
and PR expert Božo Skoko found out some interesting information about what ethnic 
groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina think of each other. For example, almost one third of 
Bosniaks think that Bosnia and Herzegovina is, or rather should be, a Bosniak national 
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state.
206
 Also, some 73% of people said that the consequences of war like ethnic tensions 
are still present in Bosnian-Herzegovinian society, which is worrying information.
207
 
Still, not everything is so grim. 84% of people think that it is the time for reconciliation, 
which gives hope that Bosnia and Herzegovina can function as a normal state led by its 
own politicians without the High Representative with dictatorial powers.
208
 The only 
question is what this new Bosnia and Herzegovina should look like. More than 70% of 
Bosniaks and Croats would like to change the illogical Dayton constitution (78% and 
71% respectively, and although for almost completely different reasons), only 27% of 
Serbs are willing to do so, because they are quite satisfied with the rights they have in 
Republika Srpska.
209
 Finally, it was very surprising that 60% of people were in favor of 
the three entities solution which would give one Federal unit to each ethnic group in the 
new, Federal Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially when we compare these results with the 
2010 research mentioned earlier.
210
 It is interesting to see that 77% of Serbs like this idea, 
even more than Croats (69%), who would benefit the most from this solution. Even 
Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik stated on multiple occasions that Croats have to 
get their own entity made of Croat territory in the Federation in order to solve the “Croat 
issue”, thus creating an unlikely alliance between Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats and 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbs.
 211
 Still, only 37% of Bosniaks are in favor of this idea, 
which is still an all-time high number.  
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As the largest ethnic group and the ethnic group that is most concerned about the 
survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a united country, Bosniak politicians should look 
more into possible solutions to the “Croat issue” and other political issues plaguing the 
country, if Bosnia and Herzegovina is to survive in the long run. Otherwise, Republika 
Srpska might secede, followed by Croat parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, leaving the 
Bosniak parts surrounded by somewhat hostile Serbian and Croatian states. This is the 
worst possible scenario for Bosniaks. None of the possible solutions is perfect, but as 
always, there are bad, terrible and even worse solutions, and all three ethnic groups in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina should agree on the most feasible solution, which in my opinion 
is the three federal units (entities) solution. Finally, it is important to note that the lack of 
understanding in the west, especially in the US, about the political realities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and the problems that Croats face today is disturbing. I truly hope that this 
paper will shed some light on these problems, because it is unbelievable that in the 
analysis for the US senate about current issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina the case of 
Komšić and usurpation of Croat positions are not even mentioned. 212 
Possible solutions: 
A unitary state 
A unitary state, organized like many European national states, would dissolve the 
special rights of the three ethnic groups and solve the problems of national minorities 
unable to be elected in the Presidency at the moment. Moreover, it is believed that such a 
state would be more functional, and with reduced administration, more economical and 
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sustainable.
213
 Even though such a solution, which would put everyone in the “equal legal 
position” seems like a good idea, it could never work in practice. This solution is 
advocated by pro-Bosnian parties and some Westerners probably far removed from 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian realities. Almost all Croats and Serbs are against it, and it is very 
likely that they would blockade such a solution in the parliament, and even rise in 
rebellion if needed. Quite simply, a unitary state could never be achieved, unless Croats 
and Serbs are militarily defeated in detail by Bosniaks in another war which cannot 
happen today. Croats and Serbs fear that they would be dominated by more numerous 
Bosniaks in a unitary state, and therefore such a solution could not be sustainable in the 
long run. 
The drawback is that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a highly complicated multi-
national state with a bloody history, and a liberal unitary state is just not a feasible 
solution. Such a state, even if established, would soon find itself embroiled in civil war, 
or at least in civil disobedience and uprisings by Croats and Serbs. Moreover, a unitary 
state would not solve the “Croat issue” and their marginalization, but would further 
marginalize them, removing the protection and political power that they have at Cantonal 
levels. The centralized state, dreamed of some Bosniaks, is even warned against by the 
EU,
214
 and it is the one out of my seven possible solutions that is most likely to fail. 
Simply, Republika Srpska would veto any effort to reorganize Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
such way that it would completely erase the stipulations of the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
Any serious discussion about this solution is pointless, because it would fail in reality 
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despite sounding achievable in theory. Therefore, this solution should be scratched off the 
table, and any pursuit of such goals may only result in further divisions and separatist 
sentiment from Croats and Serbs as a counter to such tendencies.    
Regionalization 
 A “regions solutions” is an interesting proposal that is simply a modified “unitary 
state” model. Because of this association it suffers from many dangers and drawbacks 
that the previous solution also suffers from. This model, advocated by most pro-Bosnian 
and Bosniak parties, but also some Croat parties, would reorganize the country into 
regions.
215
 Bosnia and Herzegovina would be more centralized, and the Federation and 
Republika Srpska would be dissolved. The new state would have a number of multiethnic 
regions which would not be absolutely dominated by either ethnic group. Politicians 
suggesting this solution hope that it would bring the end to ethnic divisions, and 
suddenly, being a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina will become more important than 
being a Serb, Croat or Bosniak. Again, in theory, this proposal seems like a good one. 
The country would have four to five multiethnic regions, which would speed up regional 
development. Also, a simple structure of municipality-region-state would save a lot of 
resources in comparison with today’s gigantic bureaucratic apparatus.216 Also, the 
premise is that if there are no ethnic cantons and entities, people are more likely to put 
past grievances aside and just identify as Bosnians and Herzegovinians.  
 The main drawback of this proposal is that again, there is a fear of 
marginalization of non-Bosniaks because Bosniaks make almost 50% of population and 
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they could easily form government in the parliament without Croat and Serb parties, 
something that happened twice in the Federation already. Republika Srpska and its 
representatives would never allow such change, because the war was stopped only after 
limited independence within Bosnia and Herzegovina was guaranteed to the Serbs in the 
form of Republika Srpska. It is not likely that they would give these freedoms and rights 
away twenty years after the war, especially because tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
are as high as ever. Moreover, this model would not secure Croats their political rights 
and no one could guarantee Croats that they would be able to elect their legitimate 
representatives. Furthermore, future regions even if they would not have absolute 
majority (two thirds of population) of any ethnic group, would still have the relative 
majority of one ethnic group in every of them. This would create political competition of 
ethnic groups for power in these regions, and possibly result in civil disobedience and 
even rebellions by the relative minorities in these regions. We should not forget that 
almost every single city, town and village in Bosnia and Herzegovina is dominated by 
one ethnic group and ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina are always trying to 
preserve their self-interest over other groups. Finally, it would be very hard to establish 
these regions and to define not only their borders, but also their powers. Therefore, even 
if by some miracle there is a reorganization of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbs are 
bypassed in it, the regionalization would not be functional. Even if it is not as bad as an 
“unitary state”, in the end Bosnia and Herzegovina would end up as a centralized state 
dominated by Bosniaks, something that Croats and Serbs could never let happen without 
going to war. 
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Cantons 
Cantonization of whole Bosnia and Herzegovina is a good compromise solution, 
but it is very unlikely that it would be ever accepted by Serb politicians, and depending 
on the nature of cantonization, also by Bosniak politicians. The goal of such reformation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be to make it more like Switzerland for example, 
where Cantons would make up the middle layer of government between municipalities 
and state, protecting the rights of ethnic groups. While many Bosniak politicians would 
likely accept this solution if it would mean the dissolution of Republika Srpska, Serb 
politicians would never accept such a deal.
217
 Cantons might be a good solution, but it 
would be very hard in practice to determine the borders and powers of these cantons. It is 
very likely that some of them would be very underdeveloped, while the Sarajevo canton, 
much like today’s in the Federation, would receive excess tax revenue in comparison 
with other cantons. Also, cantonzation would not solve the problem of marginalization of 
ethnic minorities in cantons where one ethnic group is the absolute majority (more than 
2/3 of the population). Therefore, the Croat issue would not necessarily be completely 
solved.  
Croats are actually the most vocal group in support of this solution, because they 
believe that the cantons would protect their rights in the territory in which they are the 
majority, as well as giving Croats separate electoral units, in contrast to the present state 
in which Croats share electoral units with four times more numerous Bosniaks. Actually, 
depending on the number of cantons, it is possible that the new administration might be 
as gigantic as the current administration, and then there is always the question of the 
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power of cantons. If they have powers that entities enjoy today, then the administration is 
likely to become even more expensive and simply unsustainable in most of the country. If 
they have fewer powers, then Bosnia and Herzegovina would become more centralized, a 
fear of many Croats and Serbs. Therefore, even though it seems like a good compromise 
solution, cantonization of the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina is unlikely to happen, 
and even less likely to become politically and economically sustainable. Serbs will veto 
any reform that would take power from Republika Srpska, and would never allow its 
dissolution, even in the face of the war. Moreover, the real problem in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is not Republika Srpska and its organizations, but rather the Federation in 
which Croats and Bosniaks are often struggling for more power. Therefore, to solve the 
Croat issue and ease tensions, we should look at ways to reform the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina rather than the whole state, because it is unlikely that the Serbs would 
ever allow any changes to the organization of the territory under Republika Srpska.  
Return to the original Washington Agreement 
One relatively easy way to reform Bosnia and Herzegovina and solve the Croat 
issue would be to simply revert back to the original Washington Agreement in the 
Federation, or at least remove some of the more controversial amendments to the Federal 
constitution created by the OHR. Still, this is impossible while the OHR is still active in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is unlikely that the Bosniak parties would support 
amendments to do such a thing. The good thing about this reform would be that Croats 
could enjoy the protections and rights that they did in the 1990s after the war, without 
touching the structure of the country mapped out in the Dayton Agreement. Moreover, 
these reforms, together with the introduction of a separate Croat electoral unit for 
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Presidency, would allow Croats to enjoy their political rights without further division of 
the country and the redrawing of borders. It is very likely that Croats would accept this 
solution, as well as the Serbs, who do not really care what is going on in the Federation, 
as long as it does not influence Republika Srpska. Bosniak politicians would likely be 
against such counter-reforms, but are more likely to accept this solution as a compromise 
rather than the three republics or three entities solution.  
The representatives of the “international community” in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
headed by the OHR would never allow the removal of controversial amendments in order 
to revert back to the more or less original Washington Agreement, because it would 
portray the OHR’s involvement and reforms in the last two decades as one huge failure. 
Moreover, this could potentially solve the Croat issue, but it is still a question if Croats 
would be satisfied with only that after a decade of marginalization and losing their rights. 
It is likely that they would want better guarantees than this, ideally in the form of third 
entity. Moreover, this solution would not solve the problem of a gigantic administration 
financed through foreign aid and massive loans that Bosnia and Herzegovina simply 
cannot pay back.
218
 Therefore, the reformation of the electoral laws might be a good 
immediate first step to protect Croat rights until a better reform can be agreed upon in the 
near future. Still, just by itself, it is not a good solution and is likely to be little for 
departing from the status quo, because Bosnia and Herzegovina in the present form is 
unsustainable and will likely fail, and possibly dissolve if a viable solution is not 
implemented relatively soon.  
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The status quo and possible dissolution 
The biggest danger facing Bosnia and Herzegovina is retaining the status quo and 
not reforming at all. Reforms are necessary in order to protect the Croats and reverse the 
increasingly centralistic tendencies of Bosniak parties in order to create a new Bosnia and 
Herzegovina which will be loved by all three ethnic groups and national minorities. The 
implementation of Sejdić-Finci ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that found 
the Bosnian-Herzegovinian constitution and the method of running elections to the 
Presidency were in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina must correct this in order to begin negotiations with the EU.
219
 Still, any 
such reforms should also include administrative reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
make it financially more sustainable, as well as making sure that Croats have an equal 
position with Serbs and Bosniaks. Therefore, until Bosnia and Herzegovina is reformed, 
it is impossible for it to join the EU, and hence it is stuck in the status quo that had lasted 
for almost two decades. Bosnia and Herzegovina today is plagued with poverty, ethnic 
tension and extremism. The status quo is simply not sustainable for much longer. A 
compromise must be found soon, otherwise the country faces the grim possibility of 
dissolution and the renewal of violence. The German ambassador in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Christian Hellbach said that reforms are necessary, because Bosnia and 
Herzegovina simply cannot finance administration and pensions any more by taking 
foreign loans.
220
 Soon, it will run out of options, and when that happens, social unrests 
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like the ones in 2014 can easily turn into ethnic violence. Such a road would lead Bosnia 
and Herzegovina into chaos and dissolution. 
The Serbs are fine with their position in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and while they 
have separatist tendencies, there are unlikely to be realized unless the situation in the 
Federation radicalizes. The burden of responsibility for the future of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is on Bosniak and Croat politicians in the Federation, and on their ability to 
reach a compromise and to reform the Federation. If that does not happen soon, quite 
ironically, pro-Bosnian politicians who swear to maintain integrity and uphold the unity 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina might cause its dissolution. Even the International Crisis 
Group predicted such a possibility in their last report on Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Theysaid that such a scenario might not be the worst, if Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot 
reform in an independent country that treats all its three constituent peoples equally.
221
 
Therefore, it might be time for Bosniak politicians to accept the reality that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is a multiethnic state with a troubled past and an unsustainable present 
economic situation, and as such, the only hope of survival is if it is reformed into a 
decentralized state that treats all three ethnic groups equally, no matter how politically 
and emotionally painful these reforms might be for some Bosniaks who dream of a 
unitary state. The status quo is simply unsustainable, and will likely be fatal for the future 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because without political reforms, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
cannot enter the EU, nor reform its economy and take advantage of EU funds to curb its 
record unemployment and poverty.  
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Three republics 
The very first “peace plan” offered to the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was the so-called Lisbon Plan that offered three republics plan. It was 
rejected by the Bosniaks in March 1992, only a few days before the full escalation of the 
war. It would be somewhat ironic if Bosnia and Herzegovina would be reorganized into a 
federal union of three republics more than two decades after this original proposal that 
might have stopped the bloodshed. Such a proposal would likely leave Republika Srpska 
as one republic, and create two republics from the territory of the Federation: one with a 
Croat majority from Croat cantons and Croat municipalities in mixed cantons, and one 
Bosniak with Bosniak municipalities and cantons. These new republics would have the 
power of today’s entities, and maybe even some additional ones from the state level up in 
order to make a Bosnia and Herzegovina more decentralized country. Serbs are very 
likely to accept this proposal, and it would likely be a dream come true for Croats. Still, 
Bosniaks are very much against this proposal, because some of them see Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as an exclusive Bosniak homeland, and any further internal borders and 
divisions based on ethnic lines are seen as an introduction to the final dissolution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by separatist Croats and Serbs.
222
 Maybe, given all the dangers 
of the status quo, Bosniaks would accept this deal in the near future, in exchange for less 
power to these republics than entities have at the moment, which would then again be 
vetoed by the Serbs. Simply, there is no good solution to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
puzzle and the Croat issue that would satisfy all sides. It is likely that, if they want the 
country to stay together and enter the EU eventually, Bosniaks will have to swallow a 
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bitter pill and acknowledge the Croat right to their own entity or republic as Serbs have 
today. 
The upsides of the new republic system would be that each republic would have a 
territory for each ethnic group, and the administration could be cut down in size. There 
would be just two republics in the territory of the Federation, thus cutting down from ten 
cantonal and one federal government to just two republic governments. Moreover, such 
reorganization would solve the Croat issue and provide long lasting peace and the 
rebuilding of trust between Croats and Bosniaks. It is likely that the economy would also 
benefit, because now Croats would pay taxes to the Croat republic, and thus people 
would be less likely to evade taxes than before when they were going to Sarajevo. Also, 
other issues, such as the Croat TV channel could be solved in a new republic 
governments, which would also eliminate the need for two houses of parliament. Finally, 
another upside of this system would be the solution of the Sejdić-Finici issue and the 
potential for Bosnia and Herzegovina to enter the EU eventually. Each of the three 
republics could elect one member to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Presidency, and 
members of the Presidency would not have to be ethnically Bosniak, Croat and Serb 
respectively, but rather just elected in each one of these three proposed republics. 
The downside of this proposal is that Bosniaks will likely not agree to it, 
especially because of the idea of giving more powers to the republics than entities have 
today. Also, there would be the question of protection of national minorities in these new 
republics which would form new Confederal Bosnia and Herzegovina. There would have 
to be laws and mechanisms in place that would guarantee the protection of Bosniaks, 
Serbs, and Others in the Croat republic (and vice versa), but such mechanisms are 
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possible to establish, as they already exist (although they are less than perfect) in 
Republika Srpska. Another danger is the possible secessionist tendencies of Serb and 
Croat republics and their wish to join Serbia and Croatia respectively at some later 
point.
223
 I think that such issues are easily solvable by stating in the new constitution that 
secession is only possible if all three republics agree that it is in everyone’s best interest, 
thus reassuring Bosniaks that the Serbs and Croats will not secede and leave a small 
Bosniak state surrounded by Croat and Serb republics. The real issue would be finding 
exact borders of new republics.  
While it would be easy for the Serb republic, which would have the borders of 
Republika Srpska plus the Serb parts of District Brčko, it might be harder for the Croat 
and Bosniak republics. Even though eight cantons have clear ethnic majorities (with the 
exception of two Croat municipalities in one Bosniak canton and three Serb 
municipalities in one Croat canton), the problem is in the two mixed cantons. Still, I 
believe that municipality borders in these cantons can be easily changed so that few 
multiethnic municipalities in Central Bosnia are “divided” into Croat and Bosniak 
municipalities by the ethnic structure of different towns and villages, based on the 2013 
census whose ethnic results will be published in June 2015. Moreover, because of the 
territorial discontinuity of the three new republics, any secessionist tensions would be 
hard to achieve, except maybe in Serb case because they would have a more or less 
territorially continuous republic. The discontinuity of republics could reassure Bosniaks 
that Croats will not try to secede. Still, I think that Bosniaks are not very likely to accept 
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such a deal, and thus a three entities compromise would be more realistic and if reached it 
could even unblock the negotiations of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the EU.     
Three entities 
 Three entities, a slight modification of the three republic proposal, would be the 
best solution in my opinion. Serbs would be fine with it, as long as it does not take away 
any powers from their entity. Croats would finally feel like they are on an equal level 
with Serbs and Bosniaks. Bosniaks do dislike the idea, but realistically it is the only 
proposal that would allow all three ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be equal, 
and therefore allowing Bosnia and Herzegovina to eventually join the EU. Because of 
this Bosniaks should accept it if they want Bosnia and Herzegovina to finally escape the 
political and economic black hole in which it was stuck for last two decades. It might 
seem to some as accepting Croat war goals, but it is nothing more than what ethnic 
groups have in other multiethnic European states such as Belgium and Switzerland. In 
order to alleviate the fear of the Bosniak public, it might be a smart idea to call new 
entities by medieval historic names of Bosnia’s and Herzegovina’s regions rather than the 
much hated Herzeg-Bosnia name that Bosniak despise while many Croats still want to 
use. Bosniaks are not likely to accept this deal, although they might, because the 
alternative is further depressing economic trends and political isolation for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina which might led to a Republika Srpska secession.
224
 It is not an easy choice, 
but if they want to preserve the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is a choice that they 
should make. Croats, who were stripped of many political rights in the last decade and a 
half, will not start trusting Bosniaks again without such concessions. 
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   The upside of this proposal is that it solves not only the Croat issue, but also the 
Sejdić-Finci issue, in the same way as explained above through the three republics 
option. Because new entities will be territorially discontinued, Croats are not very likely 
to have secessionist tendencies, because that would mean abandoning Croats in Central 
Bosnia. Finally, administration could be cut down from 13 governments to only four 
(state and three entities), saving a lot of money from very unsustainable cantons. This 
proposal is likely to stimulate regional economic development and end the rule of OHR 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. State level governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina could stay 
the same, and two new entities could have a very similar internal structure to Republika 
Srpska. Because entities would not be given new (actually just old powers that were 
amendment by OHR) powers, like separate army forces, it can be seen as a more 
acceptable option for Bosniaks than the three republics option. Furthermore, Brčko would 
still be a district, but now it can be jointly administrated by the Serb and Bosniak entities. 
It would probably be a smart idea to create another district which would be jointly 
administrated by Croats and Bosniaks, possibly in Jajce, in order to display the good faith 
by both sides and ensure that Croats cannot secede because they would not leave Jajce 
behind.  
 The downside of this proposal is that Bosniaks might see it as a separatist move, 
and resist it. Still, it is the best possible option on the table in order to bring all three 
groups to the same position. Another problem would be defining the borders between 
Croat and Bosniak entities. Still, with the help of the 2013 census, this would not be an 
impossible task. Municipal borders can be easily readjusted, as happened in the past,
225
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order to make sure that most Bosniaks and most Croats end up in their new respective 
entities. The Croatian Republican Party gave a solid proposal in 2014, which should be 
modified to fit these new needs, but can act as a solid base. As I said, the Jajce district 
could be a good way to connect these two new entities. The question of other ethnic 
groups in these entities can be solved through guarantees of their rights and legal 
mechanisms, in which entity with a Croat majority would look out for the well-being and 
protection of Croats in the other two entities, and vice versa. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
would still have three presidents, but now they would not have to be Bosniaks, Croats 
and Serbs, but rather representatives from each of the three entities. In that case, if Croats 
feel that Mr. Finci, who is Jewish by ethnicity, can best represent their interests at the 
state level, despite not being ethnically Croat, they may choose him to represent them. 
With this the road to the EU would be open after so many years of waiting.  
 Each entity could have its own TV station, solving that part of the Croat issue. For 
the fear of secession, legal guarantees might be incorporated into the state constitution 
which would prevent unilateral secession, as it was the case with nearby Kosovo. While 
the three entities solution is not a perfect one, it is the most realistic solution to address 
complicated relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its bloody history. With this 
solution all three main ethnic groups would be put in the same position. It would also 
allow national minorities to be elected, thus making Bosnia and Herzegovina a truly 
democratic country. Once these political issues are solved and the OHR can leave Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the country and its ethnic groups could turn to economic development 
and EU integration instead of fighting on political battlefields. All alternatives to the 
three entities solution are less efficient and only the three entities solution could finally 
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resolve the Croat issue and stop their marginalization and discrimination in their own 
homeland. If the situation worsens, there is always the fear that the Croatian National 
Assembly may declare another Home Rule, and this time there is not enough SFOR 
troops and tanks to put it down, especially if Republika Srpska coordinates with the CNA 
and declares secession at the same time. This would not be all that unlikely. In such a 
situation, the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina might become a sad reality. 
Conclusion: A long road ahead 
The Croat issue continuous to be one of the issues plaguing Bosnian-
Herzegovinian political life, preventing it to function as a democratic country. Croat 
political will was twice bypassed in establishing the Federal government in the last 15 
years, as well as in two presidential elections. Croats do not have the political power to 
protect their interests or even to have a TV channel in their own language, something that 
a much smaller German community has in Belgium, for example. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, due to its complex nature, can only survive if it is reformed and all 
constituent Peoples are given equal rights, like in other European multiethnic countries. 
Any centralist tendencies by Bosniaks can only be, quite ironically bad, for the future of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina which they love so much. It is worrying how poorly politicians 
and policymakers in the West are informed about the Croat issue. It is my sincere hope 
that this paper will help to illuminate the struggles and challenges that the Croats have 
faced in the last 15 years. It is estimated that almost 50% of Croats since 1991 have 
moved out of Bosnia and Herzegovina, some running for their lives, while others left in 
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search of a better future that included political freedom and economic prosperity.
226
 If 
Croats are to survive in their ancestral homeland, and if Bosnia and Herzegovina is ever 
to enter the EU and develop, reforms of the political system must happen soon. Too much 
time has already been lost in the past decades, and while other countries in the region 
improved their standing, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still stuck in the mud of unequality 
advocated by the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
The best way to solve the Croat issue, as well as the Sejdić-Finci issue and the 
problem of a gigantic and ineffective administration, is the three entities solution. Such a 
solution, no matter how hard to negotiate and implement it may be, is the only one that 
would guarantee equal rights for Bosniak, Croat and Serb communities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, while protecting national minorities. Reforms can be painful and elevate 
ethnic tensions, but in the long run, the three entities solution is the best way to secure a 
peaceful and prosperous Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is likely that all three ethnic groups 
would turn to themselves and economic development, instead of wasting energy on a 
political battlefield in the Federation that often ends up with blockades and inefficient 
governments. There is a long road ahead if Bosnia and Herzegovina is to become a truly 
democratic and independent country. The status quo is unsustainable, and reforms are 
much needed. Any centralist tendencies by Bosniaks might prove to be a bridge too far 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina and, leading to dissolution. If Bosnia and Herzegovina is to 
survive as a country and if Croats are to enjoy their rights again, only a decentralized 
three entities state is a viable solution. It is my hope that this paper will help raise 
awareness about this serious issue, and that Bosnian-Herzegovinian politicians will have 
                                                          
226
 “Hrvata U BiH Ima Više Nego U Crkvenim Papirima,” Vijesti.ba, October 29, 2013, 
http://www.vijesti.ba/kolumne-komentari/175177-Hrvata-BiH-ima-vise-nego-crkvenim-papirima.html. 
86 
 
enough political strength and maturity to go through with these much needed reforms 
before the situation in the country grows worse.     
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Appendix 
All maps, unless stated otherwise, have been downloaded from Wikimedia Commons.  
Map 1 
Administrative division of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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Chart 1 
Political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 
Source: http://suffragio.org/2014/10/10/bosnia-set-for-elections-at-all-levels-of-government/ 
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Map 2 
Ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 
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 Map 3 
Ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005 (approximately)
 
 
Bosniaks - Green 
Croats - Orange 
Serbs - Blue 
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Map 4 
Map of the Croatian Home Rule in 2001
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Map 5 
Map of candidates who won the most votes in each municipality in the presidential 
elections of 2006 
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Map 6 
Map of candidates who won the most votes in each municipality in the presidential 
elections of 2010 
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